A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO INDICATOR-BASED IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THE OLYMPIC GAMES IMPACT (OGI) STUDY AND THE VANCOUVER OLYMPIC ATHLETES’ VILLAGE IN CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE

Submitted in fulfillment of the International Olympic Committee’s Postgraduate Research Grant

2013
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ABSTRACT** .................................................................................................................. 3

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** ............................................................................................... 4

**LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES** .................................................................................. 6

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .................................................................................................. 7

1. **INTRODUCTION: EVALUATING THE SOCIAL HOUSING LEGACY OF VANCOUVER 2010** ................................................................................................................................ 8  
   1.1. Research Objectives ................................................................................................... 8  
   1.2. Academic Significance ............................................................................................... 10  
   1.3. Significance to the Olympic Movement ........................................................................ 11  
   1.4. Methodological Approach ......................................................................................... 12

2. **THE OLYMPIC GAMES IMPACT STUDY** .................................................................. 15  
   2.1. Format and Structure ................................................................................................. 15  
   2.2. Experience and Challenges ....................................................................................... 17

3. **OLYMPIC LEGACY** .................................................................................................... 19  
   3.1. Literature Review: Contemptuous Claims and Divisive Discourse ... 19  
   3.1.1. Legacy and the Olympic Village ......................................................................... 19  
   3.1.2. Technical Village Requirements and Legacy Commitments ......................... 21

4. **VANCOUVER’S SOCIAL HOUSING LEGACY: THE OLYMPIC VILLAGE ON SOUTH EAST FALSE CREEK** .................................................................................................................... 24

5. **BEYOND THE INDICATORS? CONTEXTUALIZING AN APPROACH TO LEGACY CLAIMS AND EVALUATION** ........................................................................................................ 28  
   5.1. Homeless, Low-Rent Market and Affordable Housing ............................................. 30  
   5.1.1 Financial Arrangements and Housing Negotiations ............................................. 31  
   5.1.2 The Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement and the Housing Table .......... 40  
   5.2. Olympic-induced Housing ....................................................................................... 44  
   5.2.1. History and Housing Context in Vancouver ..................................................... 45  
   5.2.2. Conversion and Demolition of SROs ................................................................. 47

6. **THE OLYMPIC GAMES IMPACT STUDY AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE** ............ 50  
   6.1. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 50

**APPENDICES** ................................................................................................................... 52

**GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS AND ACRONYMS** ............................................................... 61

**WORKS CITED** ............................................................................................................... 62
ABSTRACT

This project is designed to provide an analysis of the Vancouver Olympic Athletes’ Village using a contextual perspective. By applying a form of critical policy analysis and content analysis, this project will assemble an in-depth and authoritative case study focusing on the delivery of a social housing legacy stemming from hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. This project will trace the evolution of legacy claims since 2002 by drawing upon official documents from the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games (VANOC), the Vancouver Bid Corporation, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and policy and administrative reports from the City of Vancouver. With regards to the role and potential utility of indicator-based impact assessment, this project will examine how reporting practices and methodologies for quantitative assessment can be best reconciled with a more qualitative, case study approach. This project will examine the findings of two relevant Olympic Games Impact (OGI) study indicators with the intent of demonstrating how a more contextualized approach sensitive to the history, political and social climate, and related urban and provincial policies can supplement the OGI study.

KEYWORDS: legacy, social housing, evaluation, Athletes’ Village, OGI, indicator-based impact assessment
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project is designed to provide an analysis of the Vancouver Olympic Athletes’ Village using a contextual perspective. The primary objective of this project is to supplement the Olympic Games Impact (OGI) study by presenting a broader and more informed picture of the policy outcomes and implications of hosting the Olympic Games. This proposal has a dual purpose: to demonstrate how contextualized case study can be incorporated into the OGI study, and to integrate OGI performance indicators with policy analysis. To do this, this project will provide a detailed analysis of one of Vancouver’s most highly celebrated, hotly contested, and yet largely undelivered Olympic projects: the ‘social housing legacy’ of the Vancouver Athletes’ Village.

Once promised as an answer to some of Vancouver’s most pressing urban needs— a lack of affordable housing and escalating homeless population— the Athletes’ Village project quickly became mired in financial and administrative problems. Despite social housing being a conspicuously promised element of Vancouver’s pledged Olympic legacy, the number of social housing units that currently stand on the shores of Vancouver’s South East False Creek falls drastically short of original projections. This project will trace the delivery of social housing from its origins in the pre-bid and bid writing phases, through the development’s financing and construction period, and subsequent post-Games usage.

The election of Thomas Bach to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Presidency in September 2013 has placed renewed emphasis on creativity and sustainability in the hosting process, calling for bids to be constructed by the cities themselves rather than relying on external consultants (Livingstone, 2013b). This project will provide one such solution by demonstrating how the IOC’s own indicator-based impact assessment, the OGI study, can be used to form a more contextually driven analysis by identifying legacy projects during the bid phase. In President Bach’s own words, bidding should be thought of ‘more as an invitation’ for candidate cities to study how hosting the Olympic Games would fit ‘into their long-term city and regional and country development’ (Livingstone, 2013a). This project, through the use of an in-depth case study of the social housing legacy of Vancouver’s Athletes’ Village, will show how the study of an Olympic-induced development project can be examined within the host city’s urban, regional, and national policy context.
Two OGI indicators bearing specific relevance to this project will be traced: *En24 Olympic-induced housing*, and *So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing*. First, the findings of these indicators as presented in Vancouver’s four OGI reports will be reviewed, followed by an in-depth case study of the policies, programs, and decision-making that bore direct consequence and influence on social housing solidifying as an Olympic legacy. This project was guided in part by the recent ideological and methodological re-visioning of OGI, as described in the 2011 OGI Technical Manual. This project will provide evidence and experience on how to collect and analyze information on two specific revised goals for OGI in its 2011 form: case studies and best practices, and the evolution of key bid commitments.

This study of the Vancouver Athletes’ Village in contextualized perspective and summative evaluation of the 2010 Games’ social housing legacy bears critical implications for the role and future of the OGI study. Contextualization and case study are crucial in the examination and evaluation of both Olympic legacy and Olympic bid commitments. By providing experience and example for how to collect and analyze information relating to legacy evaluation, this project will seek to demonstrate how a more contextualized approach sensitive to the history, political and social climate, and policy landscape can supplement the largely quantitative information generated by the OGI study.

---

1 OGI lists three spheres of indicators, Economic, Environmental, and Socio-Cultural. Indicators from each sphere are prefaced with either *Ec* (economic), *En* (environmental), or *So* (socio-cultural). So31 and En24 will be explored as they were required in the 2007 Technical Manual, as this was how these indicators were analyzed by the OGI-UBC Research Team for Vancouver’s study. *En24 Olympic-induced Housing*, is now found under indicator So9, Olympic-induced Housing, in the 2011 Technical Manual. *So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing*, was eliminated from the OGI study in the 2011 Technical Manual. For a complete table on how indicators were changed, combined, or eliminated in the 2011 Technical Manual, see Appendix A: Changes in Indicators, 2007 to 2011 OGI Technical Manuals.
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables
Table 1: Document Collection and Publication Range .............................................................. 13
Table 2: OGI Reporting Framework .......................................................................................... 16
Table 3: OGI Reporting on Key Indicators ............................................................................... 28
Table 4: So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market and Affordable Housing ...................................... 30
Table 5: En24 Olympic-induced Housing ................................................................................. 44

Figures
Figure 1: Housing Unit Breakdown, 2005-2010 .................................................................... 40

Appendices
Appendix A: Changes in Indicators, 2007 to 2011 ............................................................... 52
Appendix B: Sources Consulted .............................................................................................. 54
Appendix C: Related Bylaws and Amendments .................................................................... 57
Appendix D: Related Policies and Evaluation ........................................................................ 58
Appendix E: OGI Reporting on So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing ... 59
Appendix F: OGI Reporting on En24 Olympic-induced Housing ........................................... 60
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is indebted to the support of the IOC’s 2013 Postgraduate Research Grant Programme. This grant allowed me to collect documents and expertise on my subject at the Olympic Studies Centre (OSC) in Lausanne, which would have otherwise proved impossible. I am very grateful to the staff at the OSC, especially Nuria Puig and Regula Cardinaux, whose expert knowledge of the resources at the OSC helped my project run smoothly. Thank you to Michelle Lemaitre, Jocelin Sébastiani, and Martha McIntosh, who provided me with several invaluable conversations and a range of new perspectives and sources to consider.

In Vancouver, my supervisor and project lead on the OGI study, Dr. Robert VanWynsberghe, continues to be an endless source of information and inspiration on all things OGI and Vancouver. I am also grateful for Brenda Kwan’s organizational skills and keen memory for OGI information. The support of Dr. Robert Sparks and the Centre for Sport and Sustainability on the University of British Columbia’s campus has also proven especially beneficial to this project.

Thanks as well to the many researchers passing through the OSC during my time in Lausanne, I was reminded every day of what a rich research area Olympic studies is and was grateful for the conversations, no matter how challenging my French might be.
1. INTRODUCTION: EVALUATING THE SOCIAL HOUSING LEGACY OF VANCOUVER 2010

1.1. Research Objectives

The primary objective of this project is to supplement the OGI study by presenting a broader and more informed picture of the policy outcomes and implications of hosting the Olympic Games. This proposal has a dual purpose: to demonstrate how contextualized case study can be incorporated into the OGI study, and to integrate OGI performance indicators with program and policy analysis. To do this, this project will provide a detailed analysis of one of Vancouver’s most highly celebrated, but hotly contested, Olympic projects: the social housing legacy of the Vancouver Athletes’ Village.

This project originated with two seminal research questions:

1. How can performance indicators and policy analysis be most effectively and efficiently combined?
2. What can an examination of an Olympic legacy project demonstrate in terms of establishing a model for case study and best practices?

This project will first explore legacy as a construct of the Olympic Games and the role of legacy in the planning and delivery of Olympic Villages. Second, this project will address the ways in which a ‘social housing legacy’—through the addition of units of non-market\(^2\), affordable\(^3\), and social housing\(^4\)—was incorporated into plans for the Athletes’ Village on South East False Creek. Third, a series of key policy documents from the City of Vancouver, VANOC community interest groups, and member government partners will be reviewed. This set of documents (see

\(^2\) Non-market housing ‘refers to government assisted housing which was built through one of a number of government-funded programs,’ is typically managed by the non-profit or co-op housing sectors, and receives government subsidy (Metro Vancouver, 2007).

\(^3\) Affordable housing means ‘dwellings units designed to be affordable to persons who make up a core need household where such persons pay more than 30% of their combined gross annual income to rent an adequate and suitable rental unit, including utilities, to meet the basic housing needs of the household at an average market rent’ (City of Vancouver, 2005b).

\(^4\) Social Housing, which is also identified with non-market housing in the document Mayor’s Task Force on Housing Affordability, is defined as ‘housing for low and moderate income singles and families, usually subsidized through a variety of mechanisms, including senior government support. The current model in Vancouver is a self-contained unit, with private bathroom and kitchen, owned or operated by government or a non-profit. The rents vary to allow a mix of residents having different incomes and can range from the value of the shelter component of income assistance to 30% of a tenant’s income including market rents’ (City of Vancouver, 2012b).
Appendix B: Sources Consulted for a complete list) will be used in order to trace the commitments put forward by the City of Vancouver, VANOC (the organizing committee) and the Vancouver Bid Corporation (the bid organizing committee). The sources claiming the eventual delivery of a social housing legacy stem largely from the Bid Book, or Candidature File, submitted by the Vancouver Bid Corporation on behalf of Vancouver; the Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement (ICICS) signed by VANOC and its member partners; and official documents produced by VANOC and the City of Vancouver.

The final section will review such claims for a social housing legacy by first reviewing information provided by the OGI study using two related indicators: So31 Homeless, Low-rent, and Affordable Housing and En24 Olympic-induced Housing. Through the use of these select indicators curated for the OGI study, this project will then show the ways in which quantitative indicator-based impact assessment can be applied to assist in the assessment of a presumed, yet largely unfulfilled, legacy of social housing in Vancouver. After reviewing the information presented by the OGI study for these two indicators, the project will move towards a more contextualized and case study approach. Using a form of critical policy analysis and content analysis, this review will assemble an in-depth and authoritative case study focusing on the delivery of a social housing legacy. This project will conclude with several key recommendations for the OGI study as it relates to future organizing committees and Olympic Games editions, offering experience and example for how to generate related case studies and evaluate bid commitments.
1.2. Academic Significance

The academic community continues to demonstrate significant interest in the study and critique of the Olympic Movement in general, and the evaluation of Olympic legacies in particular. Flyvbjerg and Stewart (2012) demonstrate through their study of Summer and Winter Olympic Games’ expenditures between 1960 to 2012 that budgets overrun with 100 per cent consistency, averaging an overrun in real terms of 179 per cent. While Games’ budgets have seemingly expanded exponentially, so to have expectations for the benefits such expenditure ought to leave behind.

For the most recent Olympic host city selection process, Rome decided to discontinue its Olympic bid on the eve of the deadline for submitting Applicant Files to the IOC. The Italian government decided unanimously to halt Rome 2020’s Olympic bid, citing a desire to avoid the financial guarantees required of Olympic hosts. Italian Premier Mario Monti stated: ‘our government is focused also on its growth, not just on strictness, but at this time we don’t think it would be fitting to commit Italy to this type of guarantee which could put at risk taxpayers’ money’ (Associated Press, 2012). Tokyo, the eventual winner of the 2020 Summer Games, spent $83.3 million USD on its bid alone (Emmett, 2014).

With such risks and significant financial investment comes pressure to deliver beyond the event itself. The promises made in exchange for such vast sums of public and private money include pledges to deliver sustainably organized events, social benefits, housing, job and skill training, and permanent employment in host cities; yet, such promises have largely proven to be empty ones. As price tags of hosting the Olympic Games continue to escalate, so too are demands for accountability and transparency. While OGI remains one such tool for providing a form of objective and accessible methodology, providing emphasis on contextually-driven case studies and advocating for the use of indicators applied during the bid phase, as recommended in this project, will provide a more accurate and in-depth methodology for ensuring that such promises are kept.
1.3. Significance to the Olympic Movement

This project was guided in part by the recent ideological and methodological re-visioning of OGI, as described in the 2011 OGI Technical Manual. As the study continues to evolve into a more comprehensive sustainability reporting and evaluation program, OGI will fit into a broadened framework that will include the following elements:

1. Impact evaluation focused on long-term trends in context indicators at city and regional level presented in two published reports:
   • Initial situation based on data drawn from Bid/early planning period (G-48)
   • Final impact evaluation at Games + 3 years (G+36)

2. Case studies on best practices and lessons learnt in the focus areas of the study

3. Two progress reports comprising:
   • Contextual and global information that could impact upon Olympic planning and staging
   • Progress updates on relevant case studies

4. OCOG sustainability reports

5. Evolution of key bid commitments during the period of the study (International Olympic Committee, 2011, p. 7)

This project aims to make significant contributions to the ways in which case study and best practice are analyzed. In addition to being a stated focus of the OGI Technical Manual in its 2011 form, each individual indicator found in the 2011 Technical Manual lists ‘case study and good practices’ in its focus area. This renewed emphasis placed on case study will prove crucial in successive OGI reports. The evolution of key bid commitments is also seminal to this project as it stresses the need for using indicators as a way to recognize investments, services, and activities not only as they progress towards the Games, but also in their aftermath. In doing so, impacts can be better accounted for while allowing for the Olympic-induced program or policy to be monitored transparently. This project will demonstrate what, exactly, an evolution and evaluation of bid commitments looks like, providing an example for future organizing committees tasked with conducting OGI. By eventually attaching indicators to policies or programs during the bid-writing phase, the evaluation process will become more streamlined, relevant, and accessible, allowing targeted strategic planning initiatives and key bid commitments to be tracked over time.
1.4. Methodological Approach

This project consists of a multi- and inter-disciplinary social science approach that utilizes both critical policy analysis (Fischer, 2007; Howarth, 2010; Orsini & Smith, 2007) and content analysis (Altheide, 2000; Krippendorff, 2004), embedding both approaches within contextualized case study (Heartly, 2004; Rob VanWyssberghe & Kahn, 2007; Yin, 2009). The primary form of data collection used for this project consists of official documents, government policies, and official VANOC communications. The multiple contexts this project operates within and between include the policy contexts of the City of Vancouver, Metro Vancouver\(^5\), the Province of British Columbia, and the Government of Canada, while also entangling with the organizational context of the organizing committee, VANOC, and the international organizing body, the IOC.

Documents were collected at three sites over the course of this project.\(^6\) First, I collected documents that were readily available online published by VANOC, the IOC, and the City of Vancouver. These documents were related plans for Vancouver’s social housing legacy established in conjunction with hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, created between 2003 and 2013. In April 2013 I traveled to Lausanne, Switzerland, for document collection and expert consultation at IOC headquarters and the OSC. Official documents pertaining to the selection of Vancouver as the 2010 host city, IOC technical requirements, and updates made by VANOC to the IOC were collected. These documents were published between the years 2003 and 2010. In July 2013 I visited the City of Vancouver archives to access files related to the Vancouver Bid Corporation’s activities between 1999 and 2003, collecting official memos and communiqués between the Vancouver Bid Corporation and government and community stakeholders. These documents were then organized by author as well as type. The primary authors include the City of Vancouver, Vancouver Bid Corporation, VANOC, Government stakeholders, and Community Interest Groups. The City of Vancouver had the greatest diversity in type of document, and was further organized into the following categories: administrative reports, policy reports, presentations, Southeast False Creek Olympic Village policy documents, ICICS and housing pledges, and official development bylaws. Documents collected from all three sites can be found listed in Appendix B: Sources Consulted. The most relevant policies and bylaws from the City of Vancouver, Metro Vancouver, Government of British Columbia, and Government of Canada

\(^5\) Metro Vancouver is a designated political body and corporate entity representing a regional district of the province of British Columbia.

\(^6\) For a complete list of documents, see Appendix B: Sources Consulted.
were further separated, and listed in Appendix C: Related Bylaws and Amendments, and Appendix D: Related Policies and Evaluation. After collecting and categorizing these documents, documents were organized in Microsoft Excel and entered into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software. Documents were read and coded in Atlas.ti, where necessary, for analysis purposes according to theme, project, and language.

Table 1: Document Collection and Publication Range

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
<th>PUBLICATION RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Online</td>
<td></td>
<td>VANOC IOC City of Vancouver</td>
<td>2003-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lausanne, Switzerland</td>
<td>Olympic Studies Centre</td>
<td>Vancouver Bid Corporation VANOC IOC</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver, Canada</td>
<td>City of Vancouver Archives</td>
<td>Vancouver Bid Corporation City of Vancouver Government Stakeholders Community Interest Groups</td>
<td>1999-2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case study, in addition to being a key feature of the OGI 2011 Technical Manual, is crucial for this form of analysis. Case study is defined as a transparadigmatic heuristic that enables circumscription of the unit of analysis by (a) providing detailed description from contextual immersion, (b) bounding the case temporally and spatially, and (c) frequent engagement between the case itself and the unit of analysis (Rob VanWynsberghe & Kahn, 2007, p. 9). In sum, case study calls for rigorous efforts to identify the appropriate unit of analysis amidst eminently social and often heavily contextualized settings. Case study is of particular interest in this application due to the highly contextual nature of sport mega-events. Conducting case study will provide guidance in understanding how processes are influenced by, and influence, context (Hearty, 2004). Case study, as it is a form of empirical inquiry in which contemporary phenomena are explored in depth and within context, can prove especially useful when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are blurred (Yin, 2009).

Data analysis, when applied to case study, consists of examining, categorizing, and rearranging evidence to inform empirically-based conclusions (Yin, 2009). Content analysis, a technique for making replicable and valid inferences from the documents selected (Krippendorff, 2004), was also especially applicable to this setting. Such a form and strategy for qualitative document
analysis featuring content analysis is in line with Kohlbacher’s (2006) assertion that a case-based approach can be successfully integrated with content analysis.

As policy and politics occur at a variety of scales and levels of analysis, critical policy studies offers an orientation to the analysis of policies (Orsini & Smith, 2007). Policy analysis is an applied social science designed to produce and transform policy-relevant information in decision-oriented settings with a practical implication, while also having a wide distribution in government institutions as well as academia (Dunn, 1981; Fischer, 2007, p. 97). As this project aims to provide evidence and experience on how to collect and analyze information relating to both case study and best practices and the evolution of key bid commitments during the study, a longitudinal approach was also necessary. Policy genealogy, as described by Gale (2001), guided my analysis of the policy production process. Policy genealogy asks: ‘(1) how policies change over time, but also seeks to determine (2) how the rationality and consensus of policy production might be problematized and (3) how temporary alliances are formed and reformed around conflicting interests in the policy production process’ (Gale, 2001, pp. 389–390).
2. THE OLYMPIC GAMES IMPACT STUDY

2.1. Format and Structure

The IOC established the OGI study in 2003\(^7\) as a way of providing answers to the question: ‘to what extent, with what results, and with what benefits’ do the Olympic Games impact a host city and country (International Olympic Committee, 2006, p. 1). According to an IOC factsheet, the principle objectives of OGI are:

‘to measure the overall impact of the Olympic Games; to assist the bidding cities and future Olympic Games organisers through the transfer of strategic directions obtained from past and present Olympic Games; and to identify potential legacies, thereby maximizing the benefits of their Olympic Games’ (International Olympic Committee, 2012a, p. 3).

The OGI study is prescribed through its own Technical Manual also mandated through the legally binding Host City Contract. In the OGI Technical Manual, the IOC explains the origins and motivations of the study:

‘the idea for the OGI study was born from the IOC’s desire to develop an objective and scientific analysis of this impact for each edition of the Olympic Games. By this means, the IOC will build up a powerful and accurate knowledge base of the tangible effects and legacy of the Olympic Games.’ (International Olympic Committee, 2007a, p. 11).

However, as Cornelissen (2009) maintains, the impetus for studies such as OGI was also driven by mounting criticisms of the Games and pressure to respond to calls for greater accountability (p. 88-89). Three ‘spheres’ of impact—economic, environmental, and socio-cultural— are attended to in the OGI Technical Manual through the use of indicators. Originally spanning 160 indicators and more than 30 themes, the OGI study was reduced to 126 indicators in 2006 (van Griethuysen & Hug, 2001). The structure of the OGI study underwent dramatic revision in 2011, reducing, eliminating, or in some cases combining 126 indicators into 30 indicators. These changes are detailed in Appendix A: Changes in Indicators, 2007 to 2011 OGI Technical Manuals. The OGI study conducted for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games was

---

\(^7\) The OGI study was originally named the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) study at its inception but was renamed the Olympic Games Impact (OGI) study in 2006. While Beijing completed portions of the OGI study, Vancouver represents the first Olympic host to carry out a full, or four report, study. The University of British Columbia was selected in 2007 as the third-party research arm responsible for carrying out the study, identified as the OGI-UBC Research Team.
conducted in accordance with the 2007 Technical Manual, with the exception of the Post-Games Report, which uses the 2011 Technical Manual.

OGI’s twelve-year reporting span is punctuated by four reports: the baseline report, taking assessment two years prior to host city selection; the pre-games report, containing information from 2002-2006 and released four years prior to the start of the Games; the Games-time report, containing information from 2007-2010 and released 12 months after the Games’ conclusion; and the post-Games report, speaking to changes experienced in the host city in the three years following the conclusion of the Games and released three years post Games. The 2011 Technical Manual calls for the four-report process to be reduced into two reports. An Initial Situation Report relying on data drawn from the bid phase is to be released four years prior to the Games, while a Final Impact Evaluation will be released three years post-Games.

Table 2: OGI Reporting Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Year of Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Year of Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Situation</td>
<td>G-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Impact Evaluation</td>
<td>G+36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2. Experience and Challenges

As a member of the OGI-UBC research team, it is worth briefly exploring several of the methodological and prescriptive issues that definitively shaped the ability of the research team to appropriately source, collect, and analyze data. While the research team is granted some degree of autonomy is making such methodological decisions in terms of reporting format, this approach was not enough to reconcile the vast and widely ranging forms and types of requisite indicator data. The indicators required to best assess the social housing legacy of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games are scattered throughout the technical manual and resulting reports, and often times, combined with other broad sets of indicators (e.g. En6 Land Use Changes asks the research partner to determine all land-use changes within the host city, and is considered separately from En21 Olympic-induced Land Use Changes). While many of such issues were mitigated significantly by the research team’s decision to ‘bundle’ certain indicators (see VanWynsberghe, 2010), it could not be accomplished for each particular pledged legacy area VANOC sought to deliver.8

The consideration of Games’ attribution to assessed impacts and the lack of a counterfactual in terms of assessment means that even changes that can be objectively determined through the use of quantitative indicators cannot be definitively linked to hosting the Olympic Games.9 For example, while jobs created in Olympic activities can be definitively linked to the games (Ec27 Jobs Created in Olympic and Context Activities), fluctuations in the real estate market cannot (Ec18 Real Estate Market). The format and structure of reporting and implications for data assembly also indicate that a low number of data points exist for analysis, another factor greatly impeding the research team’s ability to attribute Games impacts. Even methodologically innovative techniques developed specifically for this project were unable to compensate for a dearth of reporting points. Through one such system for attribution, analysts developed a reliability weight and impact score in order to represent the research team’s confidence in the attribution of impacts to hosting (OGI-UBC Research Team, 2009, pp. 79–81).

---

8 Bundling means combining indicators that circumscribe a specific impact area with the policies designed to mediate them. The purposes is to provide a more powerful basis on which to make recommendation on the plausibility of hypothesizing, testing, and uncovering Games attribution.

9 To develop a counterfactual, OGI-UBC used a modified version of the before-and-after-control-impact method to compares the location where the event takes place with ‘control’ locations that are as similar as possible to the place where the event happens. The chosen control locations thus serve as a natural ‘baseline’ against which the event site is compared.
Creating and retaining a research team under budget represents another critical challenge. A range of highly skilled personnel is required, and often times the research team must source input or analysis from external specialists. The nature of the project requires an intense workload around certain project deadlines (i.e. the release of a report), but the research team can also experience low workload periods (i.e. the lag between the event itself and the date at which data becomes available), making the retention and continuity of the research team a challenge. Creating a systematic process for data collection and assembly is a critical issue faced by any multi-year research project, yet remains intensely critical to its integrity, consistency, and accuracy of the OGI study.

Arguably the most pressing methodological issue facing the OGI project is the intense reliance on secondary forms of data. The OGI research team was largely dependent on external organizations for the collection and solicitation of data (e.g. BC Stats, Statistics Canada, Canada Tourism Commission, and VANOC). Critically, this meant that certain units of data were available for only certain time periods. This in turn means that prescribed dates for data collection are not available (i.e. the baseline report is intended to speak to data from the year 2001, but such figures are not universally available), and it remains a challenge to streamline such disparate forms and reporting mechanisms for the purposes of producing a report and drawing reliable and effective conclusions.

These points do not detract, however, from the immensity and scope of the OGI study executed for the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. While OGI has revealed a wealth of quantitative data speaking to a range of changes taking place within the host city, region, and nation over a twelve-year reporting period, the difficulties in creating a form of objective measure to identify legacies and evaluate legacies are pressing and apparent.
3. OLYMPIC LEGACY

3.1. Literature Review: Contemptuous Claims and Divisive Discourse

3.1.1. Legacy and the Olympic Village

There is no other term circulating through the mega-event discourse bearing the weight, clout, and influence of legacy. There is also no other term bearing greater ambiguity and controversy. The ostensibly articulated concept, loosely wielded by both organizing committees and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), is fervently deployed as a catchall term intended to capture the presumed—yet largely unqualified—benefits of hosting the Olympic Games. The Olympic Games, Gold and Gold (2009) explain, are routinely framed in terms of the ‘legacy’ the event is expected to leave behind (p. 9). While first mentioned in official documentation in preparation for the 1956 Melbourne Games, legacy did not reach consistent usage in its current format before the 1980s, and even more tellingly, did not markedly take off in its deployment until the 1996 Summer Games\(^\text{10}\) (Gold & Gold, 2009). The language and rhetoric of the bidding and hosting processes surrounding sport mega-events today features an increasing reliance upon legacy concepts, often used to justify massive investments in projects that may not be politically feasible in normal contexts (Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2002; Smith, 2009). Olympic organizing committees, as well as the IOC, continue to rely ever more heavily upon the presumed existence of positive legacies to justify and rationalize hosting the Games and their requisite expenditures (Burbank et al., 2002). However, defining what exactly constitutes ‘legacy’ has been a point of debate, and crucially, an important yet underexplored critique of the Olympic Movement.

MacAloon’s (2008) exploration of the semantics and pragmatics of the legacy discourse reveals the multiplicity of meanings the term carries. An emphasis on legacy, imparted by the IOC and faithfully proselytized by organizing committees around the world, is intended to be read as a progressive stance encouraging a perception of a ‘common and laudable purpose’ (MacAloon, 2008, p. 2060). Impacts, outcomes, consequences, and catalytic effects are among the terms that are frequently conflated with meanings and interpretations of legacy, contributing to Cashman’s (2002) assertion that legacy remains an ‘elusive, problematic, and even dangerous word’ (pg. 33).

\(^{10}\) Gold and Gold (2009) count the mentions of legacy in official reports of Summer and Winter Olympic Games hosts: Atlanta 1996: 71; Sydney 2000, 43; Salt Lake City 2002, 55 (p. 14)
Yet, as Gold and Gold (2009) write, despite this lack of consensus on legacy’s definition and meaning, it remains the touchstone for measuring the Games’ worth (p. 9).

As a result of such processes rigorously outlined in the Candidature File and Questionnaire, bidding cities, as Coaffee (2007) notes, have come to treat the ‘legacy of regeneration’ as the most important aspect of their bids. Trends toward remediation of derelict urban spaces, regeneration of historically deprived areas, and incorporation of sustainable design have persisted in the design and implementation of Olympic Villages in the modern era. A brief history of the use and purpose of recent Games Villages reveals several shared tendencies towards engagement with sustainable, regenerative projects. As Munoz (2006) explains, Olympic Village developments largely evolved from ephemeral constructions into ‘experiments in the transition of the urban form’ (p. 176). The three Olympic editions held in the United States since 1984 (Los Angeles 1984, Atlanta 1996, and Salt Lake City 2002), deviated from this trend, relying on existing dormitories from area universities instead of new large scale developments. Seoul and Barcelona became templates for regenerative projects with their hosting of the 1988 and 1992 Summer Olympic Games, respectively. Seoul’s Olympic Village development was placed on the south bank of the Han River, described by Liao and Pitts (2006) as a flood-prone area home to low-quality mass-housing projects. Barcelona, by far the most frequently cited example of a regenerative Olympic Games, placed its village at the centre of a massive redevelopment project of a former industrial port. However, the extent to which such a redevelopment maintained levels of affordable housing is in question. Sydney, whose 2000 Olympic Games were among the first to celebrate the inclusion of sustainable development principles into their ‘Green Games,’ built its Olympic Village as part of the larger remediation of the highly polluted Homebush Bay area (Liao & Pitts, 2006).

While the extent to which these Athletes’ Village developments in Seoul, Barcelona, and Sydney delivered upon the social and environmental claims has revealed some successes, other attempts have been more apparent in their inability to live up to their respective billings. Athens’ Athletes’ Village built for the 2004 Olympic Games included housing for 10,000 and was

11 The 1992 Olympic Games marked a period of rapidly increasing prices in the housing sector coupled with a dramatic decline in the availability of public housing. As COHRE reports, increases in sale prices rose 139% while rentals rose nearly 145% from 1986 to 1993. The availability of public housing decreased by 76% from 1986 to 1992 (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2007, p. 95).
intended to be used as social housing after the Games. Yet, of the development envisioned for 10,000 people, less than half is filled and it remains a largely abandoned complex (Govan, 2011). Beijing, in similar fashion to Sydney, tended toward the inclusion of ‘green features’ and sustainable design in its complex of high-rise apartments (Asia Business Council, 2008). However, as Gold and Gold (2009) explain, ‘the precise logic for associating sustainability with a Games that displaced an estimated 1.5 million people and extensively destroyed indigenous housing… is at best tenuous’ (p. 13). Despite a checkered, if not controversial, history associated with the fulfillment of Olympic Village legacy, bid organizing committees continue to uphold the tradition of assigning social benefits to the Games’ largest required construction project. As the next section will show, these trends towards regenerative design, the incorporation of principles of sustainable development, and the opportunity to offer social housing were all legacy objectives incorporated into plans for Vancouver’s Athletes’ village.

3.1.2. Technical Village Requirements and Legacy Commitments

The IOC’s emphasis on legacy has been iterated in several key documents, a factor which partially explains why legacy as a concept has emerged as a defining feature of the discourse surrounding Olympic bids. This section will review formations of legacy as it is constructed through the Olympic Charter, the IOC’s manual on Olympic Legacy, the Candidature File and Questionnaire, Host City Contract, and technical manual on the Olympic Village. Legacy has become seminal to the role and mission of the IOC, as stipulated in Rule 2, Article 14 of Olympic Charter. The IOC has declared part of its role is ‘… to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries’ (International Olympic Committee, 2004, p. 12). IOC president Jacques Rogge has further identified the creation of sustainable legacies as a ‘fundamental commitment of the Olympic Movement’ while also citing the Games’ ‘power to deliver lasting benefits’ and ability to ‘considerably change a community, its image, and its infrastructure’ (International Olympic Committee, 2012b, pp. 1, 6).

The presence of the IOC’s own manual on Olympic legacy is as telling as is its content. One particularly suggestive passage reads ‘…host cities often decide to invest in infrastructure prior to staging the Games, sometimes by fast-tracking pre-existing development plans’ (International Olympic Committee, 2012b, p. 40). Legacy’s free-wielding usage has been summarily applied by hosts to projects such as infrastructural upgrades, urban regeneration, and redevelopment
projects. The Olympic Games have been long associated with a presumed legacy of urban development, regardless of such expenditures’ link to hosting the Games. Identified as having an important role as stimulus to change (Chalkley & Essex, 1999), catalyst of urban redevelopment (Short, 2004), and ‘mechanism to stimulate consumption-led economic revival’ (Waitt, 2001, p. 256), hosting the Olympic Games has become a significant mechanism by which cities attempt to ‘fast-track’ developments or secure major infrastructure projects.

Organizing committees are required to adhere to several other key documents in their preparations to host, all of which stress connections not only to legacy, but also to legacies that are sustainable. The Host City Contract, a legal document signed immediately upon the election of the host city, details the legal, commercial, and financial rights and obligations of staging the Games. In terms of environmental protection, the Host City Contract states:

‘The city, the NOC and the OCOG undertake to carry out their obligations and activities under this Contract in a manner which embraces the concept of sustainable development that complies with applicable environmental legislation and serves to promote the protection of the environment. In particular, the concept of sustainable development shall include concerns for post-Olympic use of venues and other facilities and infrastructures’ (International Olympic Committee, City of Vancouver, & Canadian Olympic Committee, 2003, p. 9)

Appended to the Host City contract are thirty-one Technical Manuals, each speaking to a different element of Olympic preparation. These Technical Manuals are published on a range of subjects, functions, or themes of the Olympic Games. The Technical Manual guiding the development of the Olympic Village speaks to the intersection of sustainable development and its tangled relationship with legacy, a relationship closely tied to Vancouver’s Athletes’ Village. In terms of ‘sustainable development,’ described as an ‘underpinning principle of the Olympic Movement’, the manual elaborates:

‘With long-term strategic planning, community involvement and receptiveness from all parties, the multitude of opportunities offered by hosting the Olympic Games can be optimized in order to respond, not only to the requirements needed to stage the Games, but also to the needs and expectations of the Host City’s current and future generations’ (International Olympic Committee, 2007b, p. 4).

The manual also attempts to establish a connection between sustainable development and legacy, writing in a section on sustainable development:
‘Encompassing the three key areas of environment, social/culture and economic, it is an integral part of Olympic Games planning, management and its subsequent legacy. Within the reach of all, sustainable development requires people, organizations, communities and government to enlarge their vision, consider the future and understand how the decisions and actions they take today will impact the legacy they leave behind them tomorrow’ (International Olympic Committee, 2007b, p. 4).

The Candidature File and Questionnaire, the manual provided by the IOC detailing the responses required of those cities successfully passed through the applicant phase, also includes a specific section dedicated to the development of the Olympic Village. This section explains the seminal importance of the Olympic Village to the overall staging of the project while also including a cursory reminder of the legal stipulations to which each Olympic Village is subject. Noting that the Olympic Village is one of the largest projects the organizing committee must undertake in the Games preparation phase, the Candidature File and Questionnaire also makes it clear that the organizing committee must also ‘carefully consider the post-Olympic legacy of the Olympic Village site’ (International Olympic Committee, 2001b, p. 62).

The Candidature File and Questionnaire further states ‘venues must meet requirements and be realistic with respect to the master plan of the Host City, resource efficiencies and post-Games legacy’ (International Olympic Committee, 2001b, p. 2). Additionally, on the subject of venue design principles, the Candidature File and Questionnaire states ‘venue planning should support the concept of sustainable development as it applies to the Games in general, and to venues, specifically, e.g. use of permanent versus temporary facilities, environmentally sensitive materials/systems/impacts’ (International Olympic Committee, 2001b, p. 2). In the section calling for the bid organizing committee’s plans for the Olympic Village, the manual elaborates: ‘… the OCOG must carefully consider the post-Olympic legacy of the Olympic Village site’ (International Olympic Committee, 2001b, p. 62).
4. VANCOUVER’S SOCIAL HOUSING LEGACY: THE OLYMPIC VILLAGE ON SOUTH EAST FALSE CREEK

Vancouver’s bid organizing committee established its vision for a housing legacy in the ‘Vancouver 2010 Applicant City Response’ document: to convert the Athletes’ Village in Vancouver into a mix of market and affordable housing in the Games’ aftermath (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002b, p. 5). Rationalizing the placement of the village, the document went on to explain: ‘Locating the Athletes’ Village in Vancouver’s [Southeast] False Creek area will be a legacy and an important catalyst for completing the remediation of this former industrial site and developing a sustainable community in accordance with existing plans for the site’ (p. 21). Southeast False Creek (SEFC) had been previously classified by the City of Vancouver in 1990 as an industrial property that had been ‘let go’ (City of Vancouver, 1999). Once a major industrial hub home to sawmills, an operational port, and the terminus of the Canadian rail system, the area containing eighty hectares of land was released from the city’s industrial land base in 1990 (City of Vancouver, 1999). City Council directed that residential housing should be provided in the resulting development policy enacted for SEFC in 1991; however, it was not until Vancouver’s successful Olympic bid placing the Athletes’ Village at the core of the site’s physical redevelopment that the project broke ground.

The bid organizing committee’s vision for a ‘non-market housing legacy’ was solidified in the responses of the Candidature File, the official document submitted on behalf of Vancouver’s bid organizing committee to the IOC as part of the process of host city selection. Drawing on SEFC’s former industrial history, the bid book stated:

‘The Village is located on land historically used for industrial purposes that is being rehabilitated and developed as a model sustainable community. Following the Games, a portion of the Olympic Village will become an important addition to Vancouver’s non-market housing supply, and enduring Olympic legacy for Vancouver residents’ (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002c, p. 61).

The ‘mix’ of affordable housing planned for the village in the applicant file, now explained as a ‘portion’ of additional non-market housing supply, was later in the Candidature File targeted for

---

12 Cities seeking to host the Olympic Games are governed by a Candidature Acceptance Procedure as explained in the by-law to Rule 37 of the Olympic Charter (International Olympic Committee, 2001a). After these responses are submitted, an IOC working group then produces a report based on the Candidature Acceptance Applications, reporting their findings to the IOC Executive Board. The IOC Executive Board holds sole discretion in selecting cities to advance to the Candidature Stage. In the second phase of the bidding process, Candidate Cities prepare Candidature Files based on questions outlined by the IOC in the Candidature File and Questionnaire.
three-quarters of the redevelopment’s total non-market housing allotment. The Candidature File explained that 250 non-market units would be built on the site (p. 193-195).

Alluding to the passage of the 1999 City of Vancouver policy document outlining sustainable development as a core objective of the area’s redevelopment, Vancouver’s applicant city response document explained why incorporation of this site into the bid would prove appealing to the IOC: ‘These principles are perfectly aligned with the Olympic ideals and will allow the Athletes’ Village to be integrated into Vancouver’s overall plan for the development of these lands’ (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002b, p. 31). Shortly after the bid was won in 2003 the city formally integrated concepts and principles of sustainable design into the site’s planning and development with the adoption of a green building strategy (City of Vancouver, 2004). These concepts were further solidified in the official development plan for SEFC, passed in 2005. The official development plan cited the following amongst its primary objectives:

‘Establish a foundation of urban design principles, sustainability principles, and environmental, social, and economic sustainability strategies to enable the development of SEFC as a complete community, and to serve as a learning experience for application of such principles and strategies on a broader scale’ (City of Vancouver, 2005b, p. 4).

These planning and design strategies, both in the bid phase and in the wake of the 2010 Games being awarded to Vancouver, were fully imbued with an arcing narrative of sustainability, transforming what was once an area that had been ‘let go’ into a development showcasing the city’s commitment to sustainability and provisions for a non-market housing legacy. An administrative report circulated to Vancouver City Council by City Manager Judy Rogers also remarked on the distinguishing features:

‘Locating the Athletes’ Village in Vancouver’s False Creek area will be a legacy and an important catalyst for completing the soil remediation of this former industrial site and developing a sustainable community in accordance with existing city plans for the site’ (Rogers, 2002).

The placement of the Olympic Village at SEFC, while partially a planned and existing development project was arguably made more attractive to voting members of the IOC tasked with selecting the 2010 Winter Games host city. The notion of a non-market housing legacy

---

13 In addition to promising to deliver a sustainable games, the city of Vancouver, independent of its Olympic involvement, has aspired to become the greenest city in the world by the year 2020 (City of Vancouver, 2012a).
developed within an Olympic Village located within a pre-existing development designed and planned with sustainable development in mind notably matches the IOC’s most championed principles of venue design and organization. The City of Vancouver echoed these sentiments, combining the planned development of SEFC with provisions for a non-market housing legacy and sustainable design. Cameron Gray, director of the Housing Centre within the City of Vancouver, wrote in a letter to the CEO of BC Housing, in April 2002:

‘The City has been planning to redevelop the south east shore of False Creek from its former industrial uses to primarily residential uses. The project will be developed in accordance with the City’s existing politics for new neighborhoods including park space, childcare and non-market housing. In addition, it will be a sustainable community utilizing ‘green’ technology, building systems and infrastructure’ (Gray, 2002).

Provisions for a non-market housing legacy are also established in the Games Facility Agreement, which states that a portion of the permanent facilities constructed will be allocated for ‘a lasting legacy to the community’ (City of Vancouver, 2002, p. 11). While the city was given authority to make the ‘final determination of the form and nature of the non-market housing,’ it also stipulates that a ‘best effort’ would be made to deliver a target of 250 units of non-market housing (City of Vancouver, 2002).

The potential for an affordable housing legacy to be developed in conjunction with the 2010 Games was seemingly bolstered through the creation of the 2010 Winter Games Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement (ICICS). Created by the Vancouver Bid Corporation in 2002, the document sought ‘participation and equity for all British Columbians, including low and moderate-income people’ in the Winter Games (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002a). Thirty-seven commitments were made across fourteen categories\textsuperscript{14}, intended to ‘maximize the opportunities and mitigate potential impacts in Vancouver’s inner-city neighbourhoods from hosting the 2010 Winter Games’ (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002a, p. 1). One of the fourteen categories, housing, outlined the following objectives:

\textsuperscript{14} Under its goals and objectives section, the following areas were listed: Accessible Games; Affordable Games Events; Affordable Recreation and Community Sport; Business Development; Civil Liberties and Public Safety; Cultural Activities; Employment and Training; Environment; Financial Guarantees; Health and Social Services; Housing; Input to Decision-Making; Neighborliness; Transportation.
a) Protect rental housing stock  
b) Provide as many alternative forms of temporary accommodation for Winter Games visitors and workers  
c) Ensure people are not made homeless as a result of the Winter Games  
d) Ensure residents are not involuntarily displaced, evicted or face unreasonable increases in rent due to the Winter Games  
e) Provide an affordable housing legacy and start planning now (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002a, p. 3).

Organized around development of an ‘inclusive’ approach to planning for the Olympic Games, the ICICS sought to ‘create a strong foundation for sustainable socio-economic development in Vancouver’s inner-city neighborhoods, particularly in the Downtown Eastside (DTES), Downtown South and Mount Pleasant’ (Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002a, p. 1).
5. BEYOND THE INDICATORS? CONTEXTUALIZING AN APPROACH TO LEGACY CLAIMS AND EVALUATION

In this section, I will detail the quantitative nature of the data as prescribed by each indicator before moving on to explore the ways in which broader consideration of policy contexts could be best applied to better understand the nature and effect of an attempted social housing legacy in Vancouver. First, the findings of these indicators as presented in the reports by the OGI-UBC Research Team will be reviewed. As Table 3: OGI Reporting on Key Indicators shows, both indicators were included in the Baseline, Pre-Games, and Games-time report, while only En24 Olympic-induced Housing was included in the Post-Games Report.

Table 3: OGI Reporting on Key Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Report</th>
<th>So31</th>
<th>En24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009 Pre-Games Report</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Games-time Report</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Post-Games Report</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This will be followed by an in-depth retrospective case study of the policies, programs, and decision-making that bore direct consequence and influence on social housing solidifying as an Olympic legacy. Next, this section will provide evidence and experience on how to collect and analyze information on two specific revised goals for OGI in its 2011 form: case studies and best practices, and the evolution of key bid commitments during the study.

This section will outline what a case study of an Olympic legacy can look like through the additions of policy analysis and contextualization. The pledges and commitments made in the
name of a social housing legacy by VANOC and the Vancouver Bid Corporation will be critically analyzed. Rather than serving as campaign material, these promises will be traced throughout the course of their evolution. This section will provide evidence and experience in creating a more qualitatively rigorous, case-based, and contextualized form and methodology of evaluation.

This section will conclude with recommendations for attaching indicators to policies and programs at their outset. Bylaws and policies relevant to social and affordable housing, homelessness, and urban development can be found listed in Appendix C: Related Bylaws and Amendments and Appendix D: Related Policies and Evaluation. By eventually attaching indicators to policies or programs during the bid-writing phase, the evaluation process will become more streamlined, relevant, and accessible, allowing targeted strategic planning initiatives to be tracked over time. This section will conclude by demonstrating how Olympic-induced changes can be more accurately and effectively assessed through the use of targeted indicators.
5.1. Homeless, Low-Rent Market and Affordable Housing

The following table briefly illustrates the requirements for this indicator, *So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing*.

**Table 4: So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>SPHERE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHICAL AREA</th>
<th>PAG IN 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>So31</td>
<td>Socio-Cultural</td>
<td>Context and Event</td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Games Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td>This indicator monitors the situation of the low rent market housing (affordable housing for low-income families, singles, seniors and people with disabilities) and for homeless people.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
<td>During the Olympic and Paralympic Games, a large number of visitors are expected in the host city and the number of available rooms is often not sufficient. The situation can become critical for low-income families and homeless people. Some landlords may be tempted to make extra cash by renting their rooms to tourists who might pay more during the Games. Landlords may upgrade their rooms and rent them to higher-income families. Some cities have organised crack-downs on the homeless during the Games. However, the Olympic and Paralympic Games, with the construction of the Olympic villages, also provide additional opportunities for low-income families, particularly singles, seniors, and people with disabilities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Calculation and Measurement</strong></td>
<td>Definitions of low-income families, affordable housing and social housing depend on the national and local context. Host cities should provide their own definitions. The following data should be collected: percentage of low-income families in the city; broken down by families, singles, seniors, and people with disabilities; number and percentage of affordable housing and social housing units in the city; number of new affordable housing and social housing units built every year; number of affordable housing units built for the Olympic and Paralympic Games; number of households on the waiting list for social housing; number of homeless people in the city; number of places in homeless shelters. Data should be collected from social housing departments and other specific agencies (government and NGOs).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This OGI indicator, *So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market and Affordable Housing*, was intended to ‘monitor the situation of low rent market housing’ within the host city population. The OGI-UBC reports accurately and reliably report on the status of Vancouver’s homeless population for each demographic required, which are reflected in both the Pre-Games and Games-time reports (see Appendix C: OGI Reporting on So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market and Affordable Housing) (OGI-UBC Research Team, 2009, 2011). By all available measures—such as the absolute homeless count, number of homeless persons relative to the population, and demand for shelter beds—the prevalence of homelessness and number of those already homeless or at risk of homelessness in Vancouver is expected to rise. At the same time, the net increase of social housing units over the period 2004 to 2009 stands at 280 while 13,400 applicants are on the waiting list for social housing in British Columbia (OGI-UBC Research Team, 2011, pp. 73–74). These factors link directly to Vancouver’s promise for a social housing legacy, as a need for new units of social and affordable housing are made clear. Yet, one key feature promised by
Vancouver’s social housing legacy— the creation of new units in conjunction with the construction of the Athletes’ Village— falls far short of meeting such needs.\(^{15}\)

This section will first explore the agreements and negotiations behind the entire development of the Olympic Athletes’ Village, with a focus on how social housing commitments were altered over time. A complex and decade-long relationship between the City of Vancouver, the selected development corporation (Millennium Development Group, MDG), and the ensuing financial arrangements was one characterized by miscalculation. The arrangement and decision-making processes established in the bid phase proved to carry serious complications for the allocation of the social housing units promised in the Games’ aftermath, thus jeopardizing, if not entirely eliminating, the potential for a social housing legacy. Next, this section will review the role of the ICICS and how its commitment statements were attended to in the lead up to the Games and the Olympic aftermath. This contextualized case study of the social housing legacy established in conjunction with hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games will review the policies and decision-making most closely related to the allocation and provision of units of social housing. The changes in policies over time, financial agreements, and authorities’ decision-making capacity will all be reviewed in-depth in order to determine the extent to which such a legacy of social housing exists.

### 5.1.1 Financial Arrangements and Housing Negotiations

The Games Facility Agreement signed by the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation and the City of Vancouver in regards to the athlete’s village reveals the legal structure of the agreement while formalizing the promised legacy of social housing. In the document’s opening paragraph the Vancouver Bid Corporation explains the village will serve a legacy purpose while also stipulating that the permanent facilities constructed on the site ‘will be used as an enduring legacy for the community’ (City of Vancouver, 2002, pp. 1, 3). In addition to bearing the financial guarantees for the entire project, the Games Facility Agreement also states that the site’s remediation and construction of permanent facilities are also the sole responsibility of the city. On the subject of site remediation, the agreement states: ‘the City will be responsible, at the City’s sole cost and risk, for remediation of the Property in accordance with the Waste Management Act and all other

---

\(^{15}\) Appendix E: OGI Reporting on So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing, while not completely exhaustive of the material presented in the OGI-UBC Research Team Reports, provides more information on how this indicator was treated in each report.
required remediation work…’ (City of Vancouver, 2002, p. 4). The city was responsible for the construction of permanent facilities in line with the terms of the agreement. ‘Permanent facilities’ are defined as residential accommodation, commercial space and permanent infrastructure, including but not limited to: ‘internal roadways, pedestrian walkways, green space, drainage, underground parking, lighting and site servicing for power, water, sewer and other utilities’ (City of Vancouver, 2002, p. 2). In total, the City of Vancouver spent $299.8 mil CAD on civic infrastructure in South East False Creek (Klein, 2010). Within the Games Facility Agreement, there is a ‘no rent’ clause, meaning that there would be no rent payable by the Vancouver Bid Corporation to the City for the use of Village, nor would the Vancouver Bid Corporation be responsible for any property or municipal taxes. In addition, the city was made responsible for all permits, licenses, and their accompanying fees associated with development (City of Vancouver, 2002).

In 2002, the time the Games Facility Agreement was signed, the city’s new neighborhood model required that 20% of all new units developed on city owned lands be developed for non-market housing. In its earliest stages, at least 2/3 of the entire SEFC development was to target non-market housing for families. A letter addressed from the Housing Centre operated by the City of Vancouver to BC Housing suggested that 288 non-market units, split into one-, two-, three-, and four-bedroom allotments, would be sufficient (Gray, 2002). In 2004, the policy for developing housing on public lands consisted of a household mix calling for 1/3 affordable housing, 1/3 modest or middle-income market housing, and 1/3 market housing. This policy was amended in 2006, requiring only 20% affordable housing contained within developments on public lands (French & Hiebert, 2006). The change in levels of affordable housing at the Southeast False Creek development site was one of the first acts of newly elected Mayor Sam Sullivan of the Non-Partisan Association.

In terms of the original financial arrangement existing between the city and the Vancouver Bid Corporation, there was an initial capital contribution of $30 million, identified as the ‘BidCorp Contribution’ (City of Vancouver, 2002). With a trust fund establish to manage the contribution, the interest accrued plus the principle funds were made available to for the construction of associated ‘permanent facilities.’ In exchange for the $30 million capital contribution on behalf of the Vancouver Bid Corporation, the city became responsible for ‘all funding for the
development and construction of the Permanent Facilities’ (City of Vancouver, 2002, p. 10). This commitment is also reiterated in the Multiparty Agreement, a document signed by all levels of government\textsuperscript{16} the Canadian Olympic Committee and Canadian Paralympic Committee, and the Vancouver Bid Corporation. The Multiparty Agreement reiterates the city’s commitment to construction of the Athlete’s Village, subject to the $30 million contribution and terms of the Games Facility Agreement (City of Vancouver, Resort Municipality of Whistler, Canadian Olympic Committee, Canadian Paralympic Committee, & Vancouver Bid Corporation, 2002).

On April 3, 2006 Millennium Development Group was selected from an open request for proposals (RFP), chosen over Concord Pacific Ltd. and Wall Financial Corporation (Andrews, 2006). The request required that 250 units of affordable housing be included, along with provisions made for additional modest market housing. On the structure of the financial arrangement for post-Games, the city’s report stated: ‘The City will ensure financing is available to construct the Affordable Housing and, in collaboration with BC Housing, will provide design and program direction to Millennium and select the non-profit housing sponsors who will operate the Affordable Housing post-2010 Winter Games’ (Gray, 2006, p. 4). Millennium, in its bid to become developer, covered most of the costs of making the site available for development, this meant VANOC’s investment could be invested in the Affordable Housing in order to accommodate core need households (Gray, 2006, p. 5).

In a report by the city’s deputy manager, Millennium received unanimous approval from the city’s Evaluation Committee ‘on the basis that Millennium’s proposal offers best value to the City,’ and also notably, the highest offer– $193 million– for the city land (Andrews, 2006, p. 9). Andrews cited three compelling factors:

- the Millennium proposal meets or exceeds all ODP requirements;
- Millennium has the experience, capacity and expertise to complete major projects;
- Millennium’s Purchase Price is the highest and is unconditional in that it is guaranteed to the City with no risk sharing. (Andrews, 2006, p. 9).

This paradoxical reference to a lack of any risk incurred by the city was mirrored in a section detailing ‘highlights of the Millennium proposal,’ which included:

\textsuperscript{16} Including the Government of Canada, the Province of British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, the Resort Municipality of Whistler
‘guaranteed, unconditional price of approximately $193,000,000 that does not ask the City to assume any of the marketing or financing risk in the development’ (Andrews, 2006, p. 10).

In September of 2006, Millennium provided a $29 million deposit, forfitable to the City ‘in the event of certain defaults reflected in the lease between the City and MSEFC [Millennium] signed August 31, 2006’ (KPMG, 2009, p. 10). At this time the real estate purchase price of $193 million was adjusted to $200 million due to the acquisition of a small parcel of property near the site. As per the August 31, 2006 lease agreement, the city leased the land to Millennium in order to ensure it maintained the title to the Athletes’ Village both before and after the exclusive use period of November 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010 and thereby ‘maintain a greater degree of control in fulfilling its obligations to VANOC’ (KPMG, 2009, p. 11). It was later reflected in city council documents that this decision was a ‘protective measure’ whereby ‘the City insisted on retaining ownership of the land in order to guarantee the delivery of the Olympic Village to VANOC (Andrews, 2008, p. 3).

On September 28, 2006 Vancouver City Council officially allocated VANOC’s $30 million contribution for the Olympic Village project and added an addition $2 million for replacement housing from the development cost levies. This amount, $32 million, was stipulated as a ‘capital contribution to the 250 units of Affordable Housing to be developed in the Olympic Village’ (Gray, 2006). The level of affordability was still unknown at this stage, as the project manager of the SEFC development and the director of the housing center were to report back on the level of affordability that could be achieved once building costs were determined (Gray, 2006).

In November 2006 it was estimated that the total cost of affordable housing would be $64 million, a combination of the original $32 million contribution from VANOC and an additional $32 million as per a mortgage from BC Housing. As the city provided the land for the purpose of affordable housing, ‘it was hoped that a third to a half of the affordable housing units could accommodate core-need households (Prosken, 2010, pp. 3–4). This statement marked a reduction from the city’s Affordable and Modest Market Housing: Sub-Area 2A of Southeast False Creek, which stated that the intent of the affordable housing is to accommodate core-need households, defined at the time as those households that pay more than 30% of their gross household income to a median priced rental unit (Gray, 2006).
The Official Development Plan for South East False Creek (SEFC ODP) was amended in April 2007 to require 20% affordable housing across all three sub-areas of the Olympic Village development site, with an additional stipulated goal of achieving 1/3 modest market housing (City of Vancouver, 2005b). While the 1/3 modest market housing was retained for other parcels of the overall development, modest market was no longer required for section 2A, the site of the Olympic Village, although the text of the Policy Report on SEFC Public Benefits and Compatible Housing Strategy encouraged its inclusion.

At this time a significant change occurred in the financial arrangements existing between Millennium and the City of Vancouver, according to the City’s 2007 Financial Report. Millennium was no longer the entity responsible for underwriting the project, contrary to the no-risk proposition iterated by Andrews in his 2006 review of proposals. A section on ‘Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements’ stated:

‘In order to facilitate the completion of the Market Project in time for the 2010 Winter Games, the City (as landlord under the ground lease portion of the Agreement) has provided security to the Market Project lender for complete construction financing (the “Loan”) that is in addition to the security provided by Millennium. The City has: provided a Completion Guarantee which obligates it to complete the Market Project in time for the 2010 Winter Games should Millennium be unable to complete; has subordinated the balance of the Purchase Price (approximately $170.0 million); and, has provided a Payment Guarantee of up to $190.0 million (plus interest and expenses) should Millennium be unable to fulfill its obligations to the Market Project Lender. The City's obligations and rights associated with this security extend until the Loan is repaid.

As the City's guarantees are in addition to those provided by Millennium, the exposure of the City is primarily dependent on the extent to which the marketing of the Market Project is successful prior to the due date of the Loan. In the case of a default, it is expected that the City will assume the completion of the Market Project and become responsible for repaying the Loan. The City's exposure in these circumstances is secured by guarantees and other rights provided to the City by Millennium including corporate and personal guarantees and the transfer of all interests in the Market Project’ (Lee, 2008, p. 21).

Completion guarantee, as explained by City Manager Penny Ballem in a presentation given to city council, meant ‘the city is responsible to the lender to complete the whole project to the original designs and specifications’ (Ballem, 2009). According to an auditor’s report prepared

---

1/3 was retained for development parcels 1A and 3A, which were to be built following the Olympic Games.
by accounting firm KPMG, the financial guarantee provided by the city was deemed a necessity after Millennium’s discussion with other Canadian lenders indicated such guarantees were needed due to the size and complexity of the transaction as well as the stipulation that the underlying land was to be leased, rather than transferred, to Millennium (KPMG, 2009).

Millennium engaged with Fortress Credit Corporation in a loan agreement on September 28, 2007. Key terms of the agreement included a loan facility of $750 million, a payment guarantee of $190 million and a completion guarantee from the City, and the subordination of the outstanding land purchase price of $171 million owed to the City (KPMG, 2009). The city authorized this tri-party relationship between itself, Millennium and Fortress in which the city became guarantor of $190 million.

The city’s financial guarantee and role in the loan agreement would prove critical in the fall of 2008 and a global economic downturn that severely damaged the international real estate market. However, even before the events of September and October 2008 the project faced budgetary concerns. In May 2008, the entire project was $35 million over budget, and in August and September 2008 further overruns of $89 million were identified, thus jeopardizing Millennium’s originally established budget of $950 million (KPMG, 2009). In both circumstances balancing amounts were required, yet as no further funding was provided by Millennium, Millennium approached the City in October 2008. On September 23, 2008, embattled New York-based hedge fund Fortress advised Millennium it would not provide any further funding pursuant to the Fortress Loan Agreement. In an in-camera council session on October 14, 2008, Vancouver City Council authorized the city manager to make three protective advances of up to $100 million. The city, as iterated in its report that it was committed to the financing option that ‘keeps the project moving forward with Millennium as developer’ and maintained the project’s already troubled timeline for delivery (Andrews, 2008, p. 3).

Paradoxically, the report stated: ‘there is no additional risk to the City of moving forward with the recommended option of protective advances. In fact, there are some advantages to this course of action’ (Andrews, 2008, p. 3). In addition to not finding need to remove Millennium as developer at this time, despite a ballooning budget and quickly approaching deadlines, the city stated in its report that the risk in retaining Millennium actually ‘increases the attractiveness to its
relationship with Millennium’ (p. 8). A desire to preserve the status of the city’s relationship with Millennium, and defend Millennium’s position was made clear:

‘The market issues facing Millennium are of a global scale and it would be regrettable for one of Vancouver’s leading development firms to lose their reputation, corporate image, and product brand for stepping forward to become the developer of the buildings’ (Andrews, 2008, p. 7).

The project, which at its onset had a budget of $950 million (consisting of $200 million from the purchase of land and $750 million loan agreement) grew to $1,075 million due to what City Manager Penny Ballem labeled as ‘cost escalation/time frame contingencies’ in a presentation to city council (Ballem, 2009). As $317 million of the $750 million loan had been advanced by Fortress to Millennium at the time progress draws were halted, there was an outstanding balance of $458 million that would be required to finish building the Athletes’ Village. The estimate to bring the project to completion at this time was estimated to be $690 million.

On January 17, 2009 legislation amending the Vancouver city charter to authorize council to borrow was passed. The amendment to the Vancouver Charter ‘provides access to a range of financial tools to ensure that the City’s commitment to complete the village can be achieved and that the city’s financial risks are mitigated’ (Bayne, 2009, p. 3). Council moved towards ‘buying out’ Fortress’ loan on February 5, 2009 before formally buying out the entire loan for $319 million on February 18, 2009 (Ballem, Bayne, & Philpotts, 2009). The City, now having purchased the Fortress loan, became lender to Millennium and Fortress was eliminated from the project all together. The measures taken to amend the City’s charter are unprecedented, as under the City Charter prior to the amendment, the city was prohibited from borrowing without first holding a public referendum (CBC News, 2009; Kines & Bermingham, 2009). On January 18, 2009 the provincial legislature of British Columbia passed Bill 47 in an emergency all-night session. Bill 47 allowed Vancouver to borrow at least $458 million to ensure the Village was built to completion.

---

18 Progress draws of $26.6 million were issued on a monthly basis to the wide variety of contractors working on the project; Fortress refused to make further progress draws on September 15, 2008 (Andrews, 2008).

19 Ballem illustrated the budgetary issues as follows: Millennium contributed $29 million and $171 million (developer’s deposit and land purchase balance totally $200 million); $317 million provided by the lender, Fortress; $100 million provided by the city in the form of protective advances from September 2008-January 2009 (Ballem, 2009).
Writing on the status of the tripartite agreement arranged between Millennium, Fortress, and the City, Bayne (2009) explained how a drastically altered financial climate impacted the status and progress of the village. ‘These market arrangements were negotiated in a much different environment than the current financial markets and by today’s market standards the borrowing costs are not competitive’ (Bayne, 2009, p. 3). Whereas earlier, and much rosier, forecasts had viewed Millennium’s retention as developer as financially advantageous for the city, by January 2009, it was the city’s view that ‘the most significant component of the cost of the project is the financing or interest cost’ (Bayne, 2009, p. 3).

Thus summarizing the Olympic Village’s budgetary increases, the original budget for the construction of the affordable housing component of the Athletes’ Village, comprising 252 units at its inception, was slated for $64 million, with $30 million contributed by VANOC, $2 million in development cost levies, and $32 million in mortgage financing from BC housing. Once approved in November 2006, by December 2007 council approved an increase in budget to $95 million. Citing ‘the ultimate design, size an expedited timeline for the construction of the units’ which led to ‘significant overruns in construction costs,’ another review of projected costs to completion revealed a cost of $110 million (Prosklen, 2010). The project’s overall budget eclipsed $1 billion at its completion, with the majority of the balance provided by the City of Vancouver in the form of a loan to the site’s developer (KPMG, 2009).

The financial situation at budgetary controversies surrounding the Olympic Village seriously jeopardized the allocation and distribution of social housing units. The Official Development Plan for Southeast False Creek called from 1/3 of the 1,100 units to be allocated to those in ‘deep core’ need of housing, 1/3 for moderate income housing, and 1/3 for market housing (City of Vancouver, 2005b). Changes in city bylaws (and the municipal government) reduced the component of required affordable housing to 20% of all new developments on public lands, while keeping the level of modest market housing to 33% (City of Vancouver, 2006). These reductions were decreased again in the wake of the ‘cost allocation’ and ‘time frame contingences’ cited by the City of Vancouver in the midst of the village’s financial crisis (Ballem, 2009). City council became divided on ‘the tension between their need to be fiscally responsible’ and the pre-existing commitment to provide 20% of affordable housing for new

---

20 Deep core housing is defined as housing affordable to a person on basic social assistance, which is $375 per month for a single individual and $525 per month for a couple (Eby & Misura, 2006).
neighborhoods, leading to drastic changes in the way units of affordable housing were allocated (Prosken, 2010, p. 2). After settling on 252 units, the number of units contained within three free-standing buildings in the village development, that number was halved merely one month after the games ended (Gray & Smith, 2009). Those 126 units were further divided, with half going to a non-profit operator with the stipulation that those units would be dedicated to core-need households. The remaining 63 units were allocated to households ‘paying market rents which reflects the design, size, and location of the units,’ having a household income of up to five times the market rent (Prosken, 2010, p. 1). An annual income five times the market rent value, $1,601 per month for a one bedroom, is nearly $30,000 more than the median income for Metro Vancouver.\textsuperscript{21} In the city’s most recent report on the status of the Athlete’s village, nearly 90\% of the units are market rental, while ninety-eight can be considered affordable housing. Ninety-three units of affordable housing remain at the Athletes’ Village currently, with twenty-eight of those units, of 2.5\% of the total village development, occupied by those in deep-core need (Ballem, 2011). The following graphic, Figure 1: Housing Unit Breakdown, 2005-2010, demonstrates how the commitments made in the name of social housing changed over time.

\textsuperscript{21} The median household income for metropolitan Vancouver in 2010 was $67,090 (Statistics Canada, 2013) while the application for tenancy permits tenants to have a maximum monthly income of $8,005 per month, or $96,060 annually (COHO Property Management, 2011).
Figure 1: Housing Unit Breakdown, 2005-2010
5.1.2 The Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement and the Housing Table

Independent of the ongoing negotiations housing between the City of Vancouver and the housing operator and the financial arrangements of MDG, a sectoral housing table was convened in March 2007. The Housing Table was one of fourteen tables convened to implement the fourteen categories of the ICICS commitment statement (e.g. civil liberties, sport and physical activity, etc.). Established with the purpose of advising both VANOC and its government partners, the Housing Table set a course of action for achieving the housing objectives of the ICICS. As its main objective, the table stated its common purpose was to ‘develop goals, action plans, and outcomes that will create lasting housing benefits associated with the 2010 Games, in the pursuit of the overarching goal of eradicating homelessness’ (Housing Table, 2007b, p. i). The Housing Table met starting in 2006, releasing their final report and recommendations in March 2007. Twenty-five recommended actions stemmed from the report: two actions for the creation of an affordable housing legacy, eleven actions to protect rental housing stock, three actions to provide alternative forms of accommodation for Games’ visitors and workers, six actions to ensure people are not made homeless as a result of the games, and three actions to ensure residents are not involuntarily displaced (Government of Canada, Government of British Columbia, City of Vancouver, & The Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2007; Housing Table, 2007b). Of the twenty-five recommendations generated by the Housing Table, twenty-three were approved on consensus (Housing Table, 2007b). The two recommendations that met with opposition concerned a moratorium on the conversion and demolition of SROs, and another proposing changes to the Residency Tenancy Act to protect tenants from further rent increases (Mauboules, 2007). Despite seemingly popular support from levels of government as well as the private sector, the Housing Table did not continue past the issue of its final report and recommendations. As Frankish et al. (2010) report, shortly after the first sectoral table report was released, the tables were ‘precipitously ended’ as they proved to be ‘politically unpopular with VANOC and its government partners, who appeared to fear a loss of control over both the processes and outcomes of the planned sectoral tables’ (Frankish et al., 2010, p. 2).

In June 2007 the city released the Joint Partner Response to the Inner-City Inclusive Commitments (ICI) Housing Table Report on behalf of the Government of Canada, the
Government of British Columbia, the City of Vancouver, and VANOC (Government of Canada et al., 2007). Several comments left in response to the Housing Table’s recommendations reduce or detract from the objectives of the Housing Table. For example, the Housing Table’s first recommendation calls for the instigation of an average of 800 new social housing units per year for the next four years leading up to the 2010 Games (Housing Table, 2007a). This target is in line with the City of Vancouver’s Homeless Action Plan, which calls for the production of at least 8,000 more subsidized units over the next ten years (City of Vancouver, 2005a). In addition, an estimated 3,200 supportive units and 600 transitional units are needed to end homelessness. While noting the recommendation is in line with city policy, the response states: ‘While we continue to encourage the production of affordable housing with the goal of 800 units per year for the next ten years, Provincial funding constraints make it questionable whether or not this goal can be achieved in the short term’ (Mauboules, 2007, p. 5).

The Joint Partner Response claimed Games’ organizers ‘have made good progress toward meeting the housing-related ICI Commitments since 2003, when the games were awarded to Vancouver’ (Government of Canada et al., 2007, p. 1) and claimed an additional 1,109 new units of social housing were spurred as a result of VANOC efforts (Paulsen, 2007b). Critics responded that the counting of shelter beds, pre-existing units claimed as new, and the double counting of the 250 units at the Athletes’ Village as social housing had falsely inflated such numbers (Paulsen, 2007b). However, following public testimony on the addition of new social housing in time for the Games, Council voted 6-5 to approve the Joint Partner Response, which most critically, asserts that the housing recommendations developed for VANOC are ‘not binding’ (Paulsen, 2007c).

Despite the optimism surrounding the ICICS and measures taken to ensure public and private consultation, nearly all hope for realizing a social housing legacy as a result of hosting the 2010 Games. The ICICS, rather than a formal, binding commitment to be adhered to and enforced by not only VANOC but by its government partners, proved to be a point of contention as the Games approached. VANOC was unwilling to fund an independent organization to monitor the

---


23 This 6-5 vote was in line with Mayor Sam Sullivan’s assessment of progress made on social housing and was supported by his political party, the Non-Partisan Alliance. Opposition votes came from members of the Council of Progressive Electors (COPE) and Vision Vancouver.
extent to which ICICS pledges were upheld, a stipulation asked for by community organizations (Edelson, 2011). The Impact on Communities Coalition issued a grade of a D- in its interim report card and it became clear well before the Games had even started that at least eighteen of the thirty-seven commitments made were not going to be implemented (Impact on Communities Coalition, 2009).

The ICICS has been sharply criticized as ‘simply a public-relations exercise undertaken to secure the bid for Vancouver’ (Eby, 2007, p. 14). As the spokesman of one watchdog organization was quoted: ‘these [ICICS commitments] were either misguided statements designed to get people on board, or they were outright deceptions’ (Condon, 2009). As Eby (in Porter et al., 2009) writes, ‘no new Olympic-related social housing units will be opened before the Games are here, and those that were scheduled to be located in the Olympic village are now unlikely to ever be occupied by any currently homeless individual due to cost overruns’ (p. 411).
5.2. Olympic-induced Housing

The following table briefly illustrates the requirements for this indicator, *En24 Olympic-induced Housing*:

Table 5: En24 Olympic-induced Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR</th>
<th>SPHERE</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>GEOPHICAL AREA</th>
<th>CALCULATION AND MEASUREMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic-induced Housing</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Context and Event</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>Net floor area of residential housing built directly or indirectly for the Olympic Games. The net floor area is the difference of the residential area built minus the residential area destructed for Olympic venues or context activities (International Olympic Committee, 2007b, p. 90).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This indicator is intended to show the net increase in housing related to hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games. In terms of calculation and measurement, the study calls for net area to be calculated in terms of residential areas newly built for the Games, minus residential area destructed for Olympic venues or context activities (International Olympic Committee, 2007b, p. 90). OGI reports the square metres of housing built for the 2010 Olympic Games: 130,064.256 m² (OGI-UBC Research Team, 2011, p. 150). This number can be calculated, with accuracy, using the City of Vancouver’s *Official Development Plan for South East False Creek*. However, what is conspicuously absent is an accurate calculation of residential areas destructed in affiliated, context-related activities.24

The OGI study notes that the available data for the Vancouver Olympic Village ‘suggest[s] that a housing legacy (in terms of increased floor area) was established’ (OGI-UBC Research Team, 2011, p. 150). This calculation is based largely on the notion that no housing areas were destructed in the Olympic-induced housing. However, what is conspicuously absent is an accurate calculation of residential areas destructed in affiliated, context-related activities.

---

24 Appendix F: OGI Reporting on En24 Olympic-induced housing, while not completely exhaustive of the material presented in the OGI-UBC Research Team Reports, provides more information on how this indicator was treated in each report.
destroyed at the site of the Vancouver Olympic Athletes’ Village, as it was a non-residential former industrial site. In order to understand the history and political context of housing at risk because of, or potentially lost as a result of, the Olympic Games, it is crucial to review Vancouver’s previous experience with mega-event related eviction and displacement as well as a series of bylaws enacted in the period immediate following Vancouver’s successful Olympic bid that were designed to protect certain forms of low-income housing, most notably, single room occupancy (SRO) hotels. In addition, it is also crucial to examine how new units of housing were accounted for and the ways in which VANOC and the City of Vancouver reported on such progress towards the creation of a social housing legacy. First, this section will contend with the history of low-income housing protections and the broader context of such housing in Vancouver. Next, this section will discuss the role of by-laws protecting the conversion and demolition of SRO hotels. This broadened and contextualized case-study on housing created and destructed in relation to hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games will provide more information on how to accurately assess the extent of Vancouver’s social housing legacy.

5.2.1. History and Housing Context in Vancouver

SROs have long been recognized as an unofficial, but crucial part of Vancouver’s housing spectrum, providing a critical form of housing for low-income residents. As stipulated by the City of Vancouver in a 2007 report on DTES housing stock, SROs provide ‘the lowest cost rental units in the city’ and ‘very little other market housing is available in the same price range’ (Raynor & Johnson, 2007, p. 3). SROs are typically ten by ten feet with shared bathrooms and usually owned and managed either privately or through non-profit housing organizations (Eby & Misura, 2006). Also typical of SROs in the DTES are sub-standard living conditions; SROs are typically unsafe, unclean, in a state of disrepair, and highly inadequate for providing a standard of living25 (Housing Justice Project, 2012). Despite these conditions, monthly rent is usually higher than the shelter assistance component of income assistance. A 2011 report surveying private owned SRO units in the DTES found that only seven percent of units were rented at the shelter

25 A 2011 report estimates 3,500 privately owned SRO rooms and 1,500 non-profit or government-operated SRO rooms are servicing the low-income community. While privately operated SROs are known to have ‘deplorable conditions with poor management, rodents, cockroaches, bedbug, and danger, especially for women, transgender people and people with health issues,’ non-profit owned or government-operated SROs are ‘usually cleaner and better managed but still don’t have private bathrooms or kitchens’ (Drury & Swanson, 2011, p. 2).
assistance rate of $375 per month, which is a significant decline from twelve percent in 2010 and twenty-nine percent in 2009 (Drury & Swanson, 2011).

Olds’ research (1988, 1998) helps to explain the policy context in Vancouver’s housing sector precipitating the loss and conversion of SRO units as well as evictions in the years preceding Expo ‘86, formally known as the World Exposition on Transportation and Communication. At the time of the event, landlord-tenant relations were governed by the Residential Tenancy Act (RTA); however, SRO occupants fell under the jurisdiction of the Innkeepers Act and were instead classified as licensees or quests. Olds (1998) elaborates on this distinction, writing, occupants ‘were not affording the barest of protection from the actions of the building manager or owner’ and were left in a ‘precarious housing situation’ (p. 8). Attempts to prevent evictions through legislation were thwarted by a refusal to act by the provincial and city governments, both of whom did not support community organizations’ assertion that SRO units in the DTES were at risk. In particular, a motion proposing a ‘time limited, no-rent increase, no-eviction legislation applied to long-term residents’ put forward by the Downtown Eastside Residents Association and Social Planning Department failed to pass, instead facing firm opposition (Olds, 1998, p. 10).

An interim report generated as part of the social impact assessment conducted in the bid phase for the 2010 Olympic Games alluded to the potential for negative housing impacts experienced in the city as a result of Expo ‘86 (Ference Weicker & Company, 2002). Formally requested by city council in March 2002 under the auspices of the Vancouver Agreement, the assessment was completed in two phases and intended to coincide with the timing and release of Vancouver’s Olympic bid (Rogers, 2002). This interim report represents the concerns of DTES residents and supported the opposition’s argument that the Games would adversely impact an already vulnerable sub-population living in SROs. According to the report, an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 units were demolished or closed between 1978 and 1984 and an additional 600 units were lost between 1984 and 1986, many of these losses attributed to Expo ‘86 (Ference Weicker & Company, 2002). According to Olds’ (1998) research on the impact on the housing supply on Vancouver’s inner-city, between 500 and 900 evictions occurred in the DTES due to pre-Expo demand and an estimated 1000 to 1500 lodging house rooms were switched from monthly rentals to tourist rental status in the months preceding Expo ‘86. Analysis of post-event impacts revealed that in the three years following the event, approximately 1,150 units were lost (Olds,
As a response to mitigate projected housing impacts, the interim report recommended several actions, including an increase to the stock of affordable housing and emergency shelters, legislation restricting conversions and evictions, and communication and education programs directed at landlords and tenants (Ference Weicker & Company, 2002).

5.2.2. Conversion and Demolition of SROs

Legislation attempting to restrict the conversion and demolition of SRO units was enacted in October 2003, shortly after Vancouver won the bid to host the 2010 Winter Olympic Games. The bylaw required that demolition or conversion could proceed only if a permit is applied for and approved by City council. The SRO bylaw is intended to dissuade SRO owners from renovation and demolition by the imposition of a $5,000 levy for each room that is converted to another use (City of Vancouver, 2007, p. 7). However, as Eby and Misura (2006) report, the intended effect of this by-law could easily be circumvented by landlords who have renovated and increased rents beyond what those on social assistance can afford, or those who leave SRO units empty rather than rent them while property values increase. Most crucially, the cost of replacing lost housing is far greater than the $5,000 received by the City in violation of the by-law (Eby & Misura, 2006, p. 11). In 2007 the bylaw was amended, striking the $5,000 amount payable to the city to replace lost accommodation and raising the amount to $15,000 (City of Vancouver, 2007). Most crucially, as Eby (2007) reports, the city’s 1-for-1 replacement policy for demolished or converted rooms is rarely realized. By 2007, no application to convert SRO housing was refused by City Council on the grounds of the replacement of lost housing or through the conversion of buildings that had been closed for years (Eby, 2007).

The Province of British Columbia has added to the stock of government-owned SROs since 2007, purchasing twenty-four buildings and totaling 1,487 units (BC Housing, 2013). While potentially seen as an important increase in the number of affordable units available to low-income residents, critics have challenged this notion. In 2007, when the government purchased ten of the SROs, BC Housing claimed 1,342 new units were added; however, as Paulsen (2007a)

---

26 Since it was originally enacted in October 2003, By-law 8733 has been amended several times. See Appendix C: Related Bylaws and Amendments for details.
27 The 1-for-1 replacement of SRO units is stated in the Housing Plan for the Downtown Eastside signed in September 2005. Action 3.1 states ‘replace SROs with low-income social housing on a 1-for-1 basis and facilitate the integration of market housing’ (Johnson & Greenwell, 2006)
reports, only 521 were actually newly built: ‘the remainder are a hodgepodge of renovation projects, ownership transfers and even shelter beds dressed up as “new units.”’ As Pivot Legal Society lawyer Laura Track was quoted in response to the SRO purchases: ‘when the government says that it’s fulfilling its commitment to leave a lasting legacy of affordable housing, it’s really frustrating because these buildings were occupied when they were purchased and are not creating new units for people to move into from off the street’ (Condon, 2009). In addition to questionable counting procedures, statistics from Pivot Legal Society and Carnegie Community Action Project show that 1,448 units were lost since the Games were awarded in 2003 (Condon, 2009).

Thus, while the OGI report may state that ‘the available data, specifically for the Vancouver Olympic Village, suggest that a housing legacy (in terms of increased floor area) was established,’ (pg. 150 games time report) it is clear that almost every other measure available, no such legacy exists. ‘New’ units of social housing were not in fact newly built, projects claimed by VANOC and its member partners were actually preexisting projects having no connection to the Olympic Games, and ‘commitments’ made in 2002 were considered ‘not binding’ by 2007. VANOC declared in its annual sustainability report that many of the issues the ICICS claimed to address ‘exceed our authority or capacity to act’ and fell beyond the organization’s decision making ability (Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2007, p. 66).

This statement raises important implications for what it means to make an Olympic commitment, especially during the bid phase. With lofty promises and higher expectations, bid organizing committees are motivated to exceed their predecessors and make commitment statements that largely remain unattended to. This raises the question: what is a ‘bid commitment’ if it bears no mechanism of enforcement?

Deeper investigation into the nature of such commitments reveals two critical and binding documents that demonstrate such bid commitments do in fact require enforcement. Theme 2, Question 2.1.2 of the Vancouver Candidature File states:
The Honourable Gordon Campbell, Premier of the Province of British Columbia and the Honourable George Abbott, Minister of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, confirm that, subject to Canadian law, her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of British Columbia guarantees the respect of the Olympic Charter and the Host City Contract; understands that all representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Vancouver bid documents, as well as all other commitments made, either in writing or orally, by either Vancouver (or authorized by Vancouver to be made on behalf by the Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation… of the COC to the IOC as part of the process of Vancouver’s bid for the 2010 Games, shall be binding on Vancouver; and guarantees that it will take those measures necessary in order that Vancouver may fulfill its obligations’ (City of Vancouver et al., 2002, p. 36).

The following statement, from the Host City Contract signed between the City of Vancouver and the IOC, legally binds the city to the commitments made in its bid book:

‘All representations, statements and other commitments contained in the City’s application or candidature documents as well as other commitments made, either in writing or orally, by the City’s application or candidature committee, the City, the national, regional or local authorities or the NOC to the IOC, including those made to the IOC’s 115th Session in Prague, shall be binding upon the City, the NOC, and the OCOG, as the case may be, unless agreed otherwise by the IOC Executive Board in writing’ (International Olympic Committee et al., 2003, p. 7).

However, there has been no recourse for failure to fully deliver on such social housing commitments. Thus, a while social housing legacy was heavily promised and conspicuously publicized by VANOC as well as the City of Vancouver in the lead up to the Games, such housing objectives were not only unrealized, but commitments were pushed away as the Games drew near. Despite serious shortcomings, the Olympic Athletes’ Village remains curiously celebrated in VANOC’s corporate reports as ‘a model sustainable community with market and affordable housing’ and described in a transfer of knowledge report under the sub-heading ‘sustainable games with lasting legacies’ (Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2010, p. 80).
6. THE OLYMPIC GAMES IMPACT STUDY AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE

6.1. Conclusion

The objective of this project was to assemble and in-depth and contextualized case study of the factors surrounding the delivery of a social housing legacy at the Vancouver Athletes’ Village. Claims made towards the existence of social housing legacy were thoroughly, and often times critically, reviewed throughout the course of this project. Quantitative information extracted from the examination of two relevant OGI indicators was supplemented by largely qualitative information from a range of sources. Official documents from VANOC, the City of Vancouver, the Vancouver Bid Corporation, and the IOC were retrospectively reassembled to demonstrate the claims made– and claims abandoned or diminished– in terms of a social housing legacy.

This study of the Vancouver Athletes’ Village in contextualized perspective and summative evaluation of the 2010 Games’ social housing legacy bears critical implications for the role and future of the OGI study. By providing experience and example for how to collect and analyze information relating to legacy evaluation, this project was able to demonstrate how a more contextualized approach is possible. Such an approach– one sensitive to the history, political and social climate, and iterations of urban and provincial policies governing social housing, homelessness, and urban development– can ably supplement the largely quantitative information generated by the OGI study.

Contextualization and case study are crucial in the examination and evaluation of both Olympic legacy and Olympic bid commitments. Olympic-induced changes, while presenting many difficulties in their accounting, can be more accurately and effectively assessed through the use of strategic and targeted indicators. For example, rather than reporting on the square footage of newly built social housing or number of people needing housing assistance, the following bullet points offer examples of how to account for changes under the stipulations of *En24 Olympic-induced social housing* (now referred to as So9 in the 2011 Technical Manual) and *So31 Homeless, Low-rent market, and affordable housing*: 
• Number of social housing units
• Rate of demand for social housing units
• Street homelessness count
• Temporary housing count
• Rate of transition into permanent housing

Most importantly, these potential indicators were all extracted from the most relevant policies pertaining to social housing and homelessness, as found in Table 7: Related Policies and Evaluation. Integrating performance indicators at the bid phase will provide a means for recognizing investments, services, and activities not only as they progress towards the Games, but also in their aftermath. In doing so, impacts can be better accounted for while allowing for the Olympic-induced program or policy to be monitored effectively and efficiently. Crucially, the pledges and commitments made by bid committees can be evaluated. Rather than serving as campaign material, these promises can be traced through their evolution and bid and organizing committees can be held accountable. By eventually attaching indicators to policies or programs during the bid-writing phase, the evaluation process will become more streamlined, relevant, and accessible, allowing targeted strategic planning initiatives to be tracked over time. In this way, a broader and more informed picture of policy outcomes and implications can be reviewed. As IOC President Bach stipulated, bidding should be thought of ‘more as an invitation’ for candidate cities to study how hosting the Olympic Games would fit ‘into their long-term city and regional and country development’ (Livingstone, 2013a). Assessment can be more effectively and efficiently combined with pre-existing plans for policy evaluation. Legacy planning and assessment can proceed in tandem with pre-existing objectives, and the Olympic Games could begin to fit into long-term urban and regional development rather than remaining extraneous to it.
## APPENDICES

Appendix A: Changes in Indicators, 2007 to 2011 Technical Manuals

### ECONOMIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 INDICATOR</th>
<th>2011 INDICATOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ec2 Employment Indicators</td>
<td>Ec1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec7 Accommodation Infrastructure</td>
<td>Ec2 Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec8 Accommodation Occupancy Rate</td>
<td>Ec2 Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec9 Tourist Nights</td>
<td>Ec2 Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec12 Hosting of International Events</td>
<td>Ec3 Prices for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec13 Wages</td>
<td>Ec1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec15 Consumer Price Index</td>
<td>Ec3 Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec17 Hotel Price Index</td>
<td>Ec3 Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec18 Real Estate Market</td>
<td>Ec3 Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec27 Jobs created in Olympic and Context Activities</td>
<td>Ec1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec29 New Olympic/Paralympic-related Businesses</td>
<td>Ec1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec33 Structure of COOG Revenues</td>
<td>Ec4 Structure of COOG budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec34 Structure of COOG Expenditure</td>
<td>Ec4 Structure of COOG budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec35 Total Operating Expenditure (Olympic Activities)</td>
<td>Ec5 Operating and capital expenditures and catalyst effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec36 Total Capital Expenditure (Olympic Activities)</td>
<td>Ec5 Operating and capital expenditures and catalyst effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec37 Total Capital Expenditure (context activities)</td>
<td>Ec5 Operating and capital expenditures and catalyst effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec38 Total Wages Paid (Olympic Activities)</td>
<td>Ec1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec39 Catalyst Effects of the Game</td>
<td>Ec5 Operating and capital expenditures and catalyst effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec40 Ratios specific to Olympic Activities</td>
<td>Ec6 Ratios specific to Olympic Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ec44 Employability of People with Disabilities</td>
<td>Ec1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SOCIO-CULTURAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 INDICATOR</th>
<th>2011 INDICATOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sc3 Pressure Groups</td>
<td>Sc1 Political, Social, and Legal Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc6 Poverty and Social Exclusion</td>
<td>Sc5 Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc7 Educational level</td>
<td>Sc5 Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc8 Crime Rates</td>
<td>Sc5 Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc9 Health</td>
<td>Sc5 Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc10 Nutrition</td>
<td>Sc5 Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc11 Cultural activities</td>
<td>Sc6 Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc12 Sport and Physical Activities</td>
<td>Sc7 Sport for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc13 School Sports</td>
<td>Sc7 Sport for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc14 Available Sports Facilities</td>
<td>Sc7 Sport for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc16 Top-level Sportsmen and Women</td>
<td>Sc7 Sport for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc18 World and Continental Championships</td>
<td>Sc7 Sport for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc19 Results at the Olympic and Paralympic Games and World Championships</td>
<td>Sc7 Sport for All and Elite Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc20 National Anti-doping Controls</td>
<td>Sc6 Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc26 Deferral and Abandonment of Public Policies</td>
<td>Sc6 Anti-doping Controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc27 Votes connected with the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games</td>
<td>Sc6 Carbohydrates and Legal Apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc28 Consultation with Specific Groups</td>
<td>Sc3 Public opinion and consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc29 Opinion Polls</td>
<td>Sc3 Public opinion and consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc30 Participation of Minorities in Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
<td>Sc4 Promotion and participation of minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc32 Olympic and Paralympic Educational Activities</td>
<td>Sc6 Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc34 Cultural Programme</td>
<td>Sc6 Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc41 Promotion of Minorities and Indigenous Population</td>
<td>Sc4 Promotion and participation of minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc42 Non-accredited People Working in Context Activities</td>
<td>Sc1 Employment and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc43 Host City's Media Image</td>
<td>Sc10 Media and the Host City Image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc44 Perceptions about People with Disabilities in Society</td>
<td>Sc4 Promotion and participation of minority groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc46 Professional Sport Education for People with Disabilities</td>
<td>Sc11 Professional Sport Education for People with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc47 Sustainability of Accessibility Provisions in Olympic and Paralympic Venues</td>
<td>Sc2 Accessibility of Public Buildings and Venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sc48 Accessibility of Public Services</td>
<td>Sc2 Accessibility of Public Buildings and Venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATOR</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En1 Renewable Fresh Water Use</td>
<td>En1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En2 Public Water Supply</td>
<td>En1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En3 Water Quality</td>
<td>En1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions</td>
<td>En2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En5 Air Quality</td>
<td>En2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En6 Land Use Changes</td>
<td>En3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En7 Protected Sites</td>
<td>En3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En8 Threatened Species</td>
<td>En3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En9 Housing Areas</td>
<td>En9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En10 Transport Networks</td>
<td>En5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En11 Daily Travelling Distance</td>
<td>En5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En12 Energy Consumption by Source</td>
<td>En6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En13 Energy Consumption by Use</td>
<td>En6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En14 Solid Waste Treatment</td>
<td>En7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En15 Wastewater Treatment</td>
<td>En7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En16 Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Olympic Games and Paralympic Games</td>
<td>En2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En17 Olympic-induced Land-Use Changes</td>
<td>En3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En18 Olympic and Paralympic Venues in protected sites</td>
<td>En3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En19 Olympic induced Housing</td>
<td>En9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En20 Indirect Air Quality</td>
<td>En2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En21 Life-cycle Inventory of Olympic and Paralympic Venues</td>
<td>En8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En22 Olympic-induced Transport Infrastructure</td>
<td>En5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En23 Olympic Transport Impact</td>
<td>En5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En24 Olympic Energy Consumption</td>
<td>En8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En25 Solid Waste Production of Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
<td>En7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En26 New Waste and Wastewater Treatment Facilities</td>
<td>En7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En27 Life-cycle Inventory of Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
<td>En8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Sources Consulted

### City of Vancouver Administrative Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DATE</th>
<th>MEETING DATE</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 16, 2009</td>
<td>February 17, 2009</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
<td>The Managing Director of Social Development, the General Manager of Business Planning and Services, and the Southeast False Creek Project Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 19, 2009</td>
<td>January 20, 2009</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
<td>Director of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 2009</td>
<td>June 18, 2009</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Services and Budgets</td>
<td>Project Manager, Southeast False Creek and Olympic Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 2010</td>
<td>November 4, 2010</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
<td>The Managing Director of Social Development, the General Manager of Business Planning and Services, and the Southeast False Creek Project Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 14, 2006</td>
<td>City Clerks use only</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
<td>City Manager in Consultation with the General Manager of Business Planning and Services and Directors of Real Estate and Legal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 28, 2006</td>
<td>October 17, 2006</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
<td>The Director of the Housing Centre in consultation with the Project Manager of the SEFC Project Office, the Directors of Financial Planning and Treasury, Planning and Real Estate Services, and the Manager of the Sustainability Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Policy Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DATE</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 14, 2006</td>
<td>Michael Naylor</td>
<td>Director of Planning in consultation with the General Manager of Engineering Services, the Director of the Housing Centre, and the General Manager of Parks and Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 2008</td>
<td>Trish French/Kari Heibert</td>
<td>Director of Current Planning in consultation with Director of Financial Planning and Treasury and Director of Housing Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 2010</td>
<td>Brenda Proksen</td>
<td>The Managing Director of Social Development in consultation with the Southeast False Creek and Olympic Village Project Manager, the Director of Finance, the General Manager of Business Planning Services and the Director of Real Estate Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Presentations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PRESENTER</th>
<th>TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 2009</td>
<td>Southeast False Creek Olympic Village Update</td>
<td>Dr. Penny Ballem, Ken Bayne, Tim Philpotts</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 9, 2009</td>
<td>Olympic Village Financial Arrangements</td>
<td>Dr. Penny Ballem</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 18, 2009</td>
<td>Special Council Report: Olympic Village Project Update</td>
<td>Dr. Penny Ballem, Ken Bayne, Tim Philpotts</td>
<td>Vancouver City Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Southeast False Creek and Olympic Village Policy Documents

- City of Vancouver. (1999). *Southeast False Creek Policy Statement: Toward a Sustainable Urban Neighborhood and a Major Park in Southeast False Creek*. Vancouver City Planning Department.
- Proksen, B. (2010b). *Update on Olympic Village Southeast False Creek Affordable Housing and Selection of Lessee/Operator for Parcel 2 (Administrative Report)*. Vancouver City Council.
Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement and Housing Pledges


Official Development By-laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BYLAW</th>
<th>AMENDING BYLAW</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5073</td>
<td>8294</td>
<td>March 21, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9435</td>
<td>9531</td>
<td>September 18, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9599</td>
<td>9726</td>
<td>March 30, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9620</td>
<td>10078</td>
<td>September 8, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10109</td>
<td>10222</td>
<td>June 12, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10494</td>
<td>10302</td>
<td>November 18, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8787</td>
<td>8708</td>
<td>February 19, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7412</td>
<td>7412</td>
<td>May 15, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8733</td>
<td>8733</td>
<td>November 18, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8874</td>
<td>9026</td>
<td>April 26, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9833</td>
<td>9975</td>
<td>December 15, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10424</td>
<td>10424</td>
<td>January 26, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VANOC (Vancouver Bid Corporation and Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Interest Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing Table. (2007a). Housing Legacy of the 2010 Winter Games Report of the Inner City Inclusive Committee Housing Table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demolition for Social Housing Bylaw 8788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Room Accommodation Bylaw 8733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast False Creek Official Development Plan Bylaw 9073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Homelessness Initiative (NHI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ways to Homes: The Regional Homelessness Plan for Greater Vancouver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Legacy Affordable Housing (Memorandum of Understanding or MOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homelessness Partnering Strategy (HPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Vancouver Affordable Housing Strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX D: Related Policies and Evaluation
### APPENDIX E: OGI Reporting on So31 Homeless, Low-rent Market, and Affordable Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF FINDINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Initial situation reported, including percentage of singles and seniors living below the low income cut-off (LICO) rate for the city, the region (Greater Vancouver Regional District), and country. The number of affordable housing units in both the city (using data from 2001) and region (using data from 2000) are reported. The homelessness count, the percentage of homeless with disabilities, and the number of places in homeless shelters (using data from 2000) are reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Games</td>
<td>Between 2001 and 2006, the percentage of singles (i.e., &quot;unattached persons 15 years and older&quot;) below the LICO line increased marginally in Vancouver (from 43.1 to 44.2 percent), and in Metro Vancouver (from 39.8 to 40.3 percent) (see Table 18). On the other hand, the percentage of seniors (65 years old or older) below LICO in Vancouver decreased during that period, from 15.8 percent in 2001 to 8.9 percent in 2006. There was a corresponding decrease of 0.2 percentage points in the prevalence of low income seniors in Metro Vancouver, from 22.7 percent in 2001 to 14.5 percent in 2006. At the same time, the national prevalence of low income persons rose from 30.8 percent to 37.1 percent among singles and more than doubled from 15 percent to 35 percent among seniors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games-time</td>
<td>Between 2001 and 2006, the percentage of singles below the low-income cut-off (LICO) threshold increased in Vancouver, Metro Vancouver, and Canada. Although a larger increase was observed for Canada, the rates for Vancouver and Metro Vancouver were significantly higher than the rate for Canada. Between 2001 and 2006, the percentage of seniors below the LICO line decreased in Vancouver and Metro Vancouver, but increased in Canada. Between 2001 and 2006, the absolute number of affordable housing and social housing units increased in both Vancouver and Metro Vancouver. However, further analyses showed that the increase was only in Vancouver (excluding Vancouver from Metro Vancouver showed a loss of units in the rest of the region), and that there has been a loss of units relative to the population at the Metro Vancouver level. In Vancouver during the period 2005-2006, fewer newly constructed affordable housing and social housing units were built (367 units) than during the preceding period 2001-2004 (503 units). Newly constructed units are vacant and have not been filled by people living in Vancouver. Between 2002 and 2009 in both Vancouver and Metro Vancouver, the absolute homeless count and the number of homeless persons relative to the population increased. Analysis of comparison locations (Capital Region District and Toronto) suggest that homelessness is more prevalent in B.C. than anywhere else in Canada. Between 2002 and February 2009 in both Vancouver and Metro Vancouver, the absolute number of places in shelters and the number of homeless people per place in shelter increased. This suggests that the supply (shelters) was not met by the need (homeless individuals) (although there were more places in shelters available in Vancouver than in Metro Vancouver). Between 2002 and 2009, the prevalence of people with physical disabilities among the homeless in Metro Vancouver more than doubled (from 15 to 31 percent). Of the above findings can be linked to the 2010 Winter Games with certainty. Below is a discussion of actions taken by non-governmental organizations and the homeless population of Vancouver during the 2010 Winter Games. Their actions leveraged media attention and shed light on the situation in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, which in turn, may have had an impact on Bill C-304, a housing bill which would create a federal housing strategy to address homelessness issues across the country. According to a recent report issued by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, the number of households assisted by provincial housing programs increased by approximately 11,930 over the last five years (Klein and Copes. &quot;Unpacking the Housing Numbers: How Much New Social Housing Is BC Building?&quot; Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sep. 2010: 1-12). Seven thousand, seven hundred, twenty households and 1,016 individuals received some form of rental assistance while there was an increase in 4,250 shelter beds and 1,590 SROs (single room occupancy). However, this increase has been offset by a loss of 2,830 social housing units. The overall net increase, then, of social housing units over the past five years is 280 while in 2008 a reported 13,400 applicants were on the waiting list for social housing in British Columbia. As part of the Olympic Village contract in South East False Creek, the original promise of 322 units of legacy social housing has been approximately halved (April 2010) due to cost overruns associated with construction and poor sales of high-end units. Some units of co-operative housing (run by the Co-operative Housing Federation of British Columbia) are already available and other units will be available in 2011.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F: OGI Reporting on En24 Olympic-induced Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF FINDINGS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>No data supplied on Olympic-induced housing projects as construction of the Olympic Village was currently underway at the time of baseline reporting in 2008.</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Games</td>
<td>Investments have been committed to establish a specific Games-related housing legacy. In October 2008, the Government of B.C. and VANOC signed a memorandum of agreement to establish Olympic Legacy Affordable Housing. The agreement specifies that 329 temporary housing units from the Olympic and Paralympic Village in Whistler will be relocated after the Games and converted into 158 permanent supportive housing units in six communities in B.C. The total capital cost is estimated at $43.8 million. Locally, the City of Vancouver enacted the Single Room Accommodation Bylaw (#8733) in October 2003, shortly after the bid was won (July 2003). The bylaw regulates conversions and demolitions of rooms in the downtown core that are designated as “single room accommodation.” These rooms typically house the poor and vulnerable in Vancouver’s inner-city. The bylaw states that demolition or conversion may only proceed if a permit is applied for and approved. This indicator tracks housing built specifically for the Olympic and Paralympic Games. At the time of this publication, there is much controversy on this topic. The City of Vancouver originally dedicated 232 of the 1,100 housing units in the Olympic Village to be used in the future as social housing. This legacy is in question as the result of recent events. On February 17, 2009, Vancouver City Council voted unanimously to finance the incomplete Olympic Village. This $500-million housing project investment is a controversial move to finance the developer (Canadian Press, 2009). Recent reports state that the city is considering moving the social housing to a more affordable location (Bula, 2009). The rationale provided for the move is the cost overruns of subsidizing the social housing project. Originally slated to cost $85 million, the latest estimate suggests a $110 million cost (Shoolts, 2009). This translates into $436,008 per unit or $549 per square foot for units that are 800 ft2 in size.</td>
<td>38-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games-time</td>
<td>The total residential area of the Vancouver Olympic Village development (housing plus surrounding and auxiliary areas, such as shops, etc.) built directly for the Olympic Games measures 139,654.256 m2. According to the official website for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games, the residential housing units of the Olympic Village showcase universal design elements, such as wider doorways, hallways and stairs that are easily adapted for complete accessibility, but no numbers are provided. The Village housed 350 Paralympic athletes during the 2010 Paralympic Winter Games. Housing area around the Village, which is part of a larger development that was already being planned before Vancouver became the Host City, is forecasted by the City of Vancouver (in charge of the development) to grow to 627,416.26 m2 by 2020. Although the floor area of housing destroyed for Olympic venues and context activities was not available, zoning information from the City of Vancouver suggests that the area where the Vancouver Olympic Village now resides was mostly an industrial zone that contained a shipyard. This suggests that housing area destroyed for the Vancouver Olympic Village specifically (and not necessarily of other Olympic activities) was probably small (if any). The total residential housing floor area of the Whistler Olympic Village measures approximately 46,451.52 m2. The available data, specifically for the Vancouver Olympic Village, suggest that a housing legacy (in terms of increased floor area) was established.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS AND ACRONYMS

Key Terms

Affordable housing means ‘dwelling units designed to be affordable to persons who make up a core need household where such persons pay more than 30% of their combined gross annual income to rent an adequate and suitable rental unit, including utilities, to meet the basic housing needs of the household at an average market rent’ (City of Vancouver, 2005b).

Deep core housing is defined by Pivot Legal society as housing affordable to a person on basic social assistance, which is $375 per month for a single individual and $525 per month for a couple (Eby & Misura, 2006).

Non-market housing ‘refers to government assisted housing which was built through one of a number of government-funded programs,’ is typically managed by the non-profit or co-op housing sectors, and receives government subsidy (Metro Vancouver, 2007).

Social housing, which is also identified with non-market housing in the document Mayor’s Task Force on Housing Affordability, is defined as ‘housing for low and moderate income singles and families, usually subsidized through a variety of mechanisms, including senior government support. The current model in Vancouver is a self-contained unit, with private bathroom and kitchen, owned or operated by government or a non-profit. The rents vary to allow a mix of residents having different incomes and can range from the value of the shelter component of income assistance to 30% of a tenant’s income including market rents’ (City of Vancouver, 2012b).

Acronyms

BC British Columbia
DTES Downtown Eastside
GoC Government of Canada
ICICS Inner-City Inclusive Commitment Statement
IOC International Olympic Committee
MDG Millennium Development Group
NOC National Organizing Committee
OCOG Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
OGI Olympic Games Impact (Study)
OSC Olympic Studies Centre
RFP Request for Proposal
SRO Single Room Occupancy
VANOC Vancouver Organizing Committee of the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games
WORKS CITED


Housing Table. (2007a). Housing Legacy of the 2010 Winter Games Report of the Inner City Inclusive Committee Housing Table.


KPMG. (2009). Summary Report to the City of Vancouver Southeast False Creek Development.


Mauboules, C. (2007). *Housing Legacy of the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games: report of the Housing Table for the Inner-City Inclusivity Initiative* (Administrative...


